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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVIS B. DAVIS, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH ANNE DAVIS, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
SANDY THORNOCK and GEORGE T. 
THORNOCK, 
Intervenors and Appellees. 
Case No. 20000433-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Jurisdictional Statement 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Constitution Art. VIII § 3, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. 
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
A. Whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to allow the 
reviewing court "to make sure the determination flows logically from both the evidence and the 
controlling legal principles." Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Roberts 
v. Roberts. 835 P. 2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The appropriate standard of appellate review for child custody proceedings is whether the 
court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. State ex rel. M.W.. 970 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 
1 
1998), aff d in part and rev'd in part 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000); see also Hardy v. Hardv. 776 P.2d 
917, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). This issue is 
reviewable without preservation at trial pursuant to Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which provides that an appellate court may take notice of "plain error" which affected the 
"substantial rights" of a party, even though the error was not brought to the attention of the court. 
State v. Eldredee. 773 P. 2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118 
(Utah 1989), State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819 (Utah 1989), State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 
1992). In an action tried without a jury, appellant need not have preserved its sufficiency of the 
evidence claims by specifically raising the issue before the trial court. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. 
Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
B. Whether the evidence is sufficient to rebut the natural-parent presumption by the 
"strong showing" necessary to support the Findings of Fact and Final Order awarding custody to 
the grandparents. Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh. 745 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1987). 
This issue involves both questions of law, on which the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court, and questions of fact, which findings shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous. State ex rel. M.W.. 970 P.2d 284, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), aff d in part and 
rev'd in part 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000); see M§o Hardy v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). The burden of proof at trial was on 
Intervenors to rebut the parental presumption. The Thornocks failed to meet that burden. This 
issue is reviewable without preservation at trial on the grounds of "plain error" which affected the 
"substantial rights" of a party. See Rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence; State v. Eldredge. 
773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989): see also State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989), State v. 
Whittle. 780 P.2d 819 (Utah 1989), State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). In an action tried 
without a jury, appellant need not have preserved its sufficiency of the evidence claims by 
specifically raising the issue before the trial court. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
C. Whether the trial court impermissibly gave up its judicial responsibility and 
abused its discretion by essentially adopting the admittedly hearsay-based conclusions and 
recommendations of the custody evaluator without any evidence of hard facts to support those 
2 
conclusions. The abuse ol iliseir-mH »»I stjndjul ivquiri's Hut ""HR1 fati» and reasons for the court's 
decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions." Barnes v. Barnes, 857 
P.2d 257, 259 (Utah <".' \pr i n v i t a t i o n s omitted). 
1
 .-* * ^ •. particular point in time" referred to in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 
P.2d IX,-II (I * v -*'-- • •%.•:•. *- • • .i it termination or to , \ 
arbitrary point in nine, and \\heihor Hiis factor should ha\c ^.;uai *\ hi *' ' • t 
in time" is long past, as opposed to being currer: Tliis ^ A\ ;ssue <»f law that has not been 
addressed by the Utah appellate courts and the appellate court needs accord no deference to the 
trial court, State \ ; cm. * - > •' • ' .!••• '*• ^ 
E. Whether the parental presumpti* . a • , t 
being continuously present in his child's life when such absence was due to circumstances 
beyond the parent's control such as deployment by the U.S. Navy. This is an issue that has not 
been addressed h\ (lie 1 'fall appellale courts Aihl as an issue of law, the appellate courts accord 
no deference to the trial court. State v. Pena, Kf'^  '-• ,,:i- ' a. - ^ 4 
F. Whether Appellant's fundamental liberty interest in ae care, istud ml 
management of his child was violated by the trial court's order awarding custody to the child's 
[!ra i:\ r *"^ v v that Father's parental presumption had been rebutted by clear 
and voin incing evidenc. a re Castillo, 6-J \ X . .-. sec aUo i \ \ei \ 
Granville. 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2068 (2000) (Thomas, I , concurring). 
1his issue involves questions of law, on which the appellate court gives no deference to 
the trial court, and applies the correction of error standard of review. City of St. George v. 
Turner, v^; • • -^ .;, dn.c Ahner \. California, 413 1' ^ ' \ ] s > •'"* » It 
also involves questions of fact, which findings shall not be set asid • v a »nL\ •.. -. 
State ex rel. M.W.. 970 P.2d 284, 291 (I Jtah Ct. App. 1998), aff d in part and rev'd in part 12 
P.3d 80 (Utah 2000); see also Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Davis v. 
ij-id v * -iK \ Jtah 1988). Father's constitutional rights are protected by the due 
process clause • * ^
 : v. ••-the Constitution of 
the State of Utah, article VIII, o ; and therefore the •: -..u .a ^ , i^ < i: • JHR\ ; 
scrutiny by the appellate court. Troxel, 120 S.Cl. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring). This issue is 
3 
reviewable on the grounds that Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that the 
court may take notice of "plain error" which affected the "substantial rights" of a party, even 
though the error was not brought to the attention of the court. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 34-
35 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989), State v. Whittle. 780 
P.2d 819 (Utah 1989), State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). In an action tried without a 
jury, an appellant need not have preserved its sufficiency of the evidence claims by specifically 
raising the issue before the trial court. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, 
Ordinances, Rules and Cases 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982); State ex rel. M.W.. 970 P.2d 284 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), aff d in part and rev'd in part 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000); Duncan v. Howard. 
918 P.2d 888, 893 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Rule 
103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case. Father appeals from a final judgment awarding custody of his 
minor child, Kory Lynn Davis, to the maternal grandparents (hereafter "Thornocks"). The Final 
Order being appealed was entered on April 25, 2000. No post-judgment motions were filed. 
Father's Notice of Appeal was filed on May 22, 2000. 
B . Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. On February 3, 1994 Mother filed 
for divorce in the Fourth District Court in and for the State of Utah, case no. 944400287. R. at 
198. On February 23, 1994 Father filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint and an Affidavit in 
Support thereof, alleging that the Utah courts had no jurisdiction inasmuch as Mother had not 
established residency in the State of Utah. R. at 208-215. On March 23,1994 the Fourth District 
Court of Utah issued an Order awarding Mother the temporary custody of Kory. R. at 239. 
4 
On April IJ I^M hilliei t t lnla IVtitinn loi Dissolution •' lS " r ':aye and Declaration 
Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act with the Superior i ,r • J - • * * .... 
Ventura (case no. D221852), wherein Father asked for custody of Kory. R. at 250-51. 
< hi \iigLi:( III, 1994 the Thornocks filed a Complaint for Intervention in the Utah divorce 
action, asking to '• . *\:t u , . \.. ,* U\ 1994 the Fourth 
District Court dismissed Mother s divorce uann h . UUK M' -in-niic: * . liis 
were then residents of California R. at 325. The California and Utah courts conferenced by 
telephom . n \u.. , * Ut )4. and on September 23, 1994 the Utah court asserted jurisdiction 
overissu U . — !,-JM* .<. i *; ik to the Thornocks, with Father 
and Mother being awarded rights of visitation. : v 
custody issue would be resolved by the Utah court upon Father's ru urn from e^u am ^  ; 
On August 28, 1996 Father filed a claim for divorce in the Fourth District Court in and 
for • Sine ••! . x ''- -*•+• ^^ ^ \ ' 'n February '0, 1997. Father and Mother 
entered i< N a stipulation where m ! * - K '. n n ^ - s i n h * 
Kon MI return f< r the establishment of regular visitation under the i una L ouni\ i u*;. R. 
at " i ; • MI March 4, 1 W the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I aw, which 
v '• i < i 11 j:
 t b |\, best interests and stated merely that "the minor child is presently 
in . K custom **' ,-oiLk- a: a ^arici) I hornock, \\ ho are the maternal grandparents of the minor 
child. The t\n.a • finds that custody of the minor child should be aw aided to - :•< »i e-
Sandy Thornocl K a A Decree of Divorce was entered the same day, awarding 
i nornocks cusnuh of Kon pursuant to the stipulation between Mother and Father, and ordering 
Father!. :\a\ \ ' - : . i[n»n pci month " \< at 24-2 S. 
. Thornocks, u i > r. HJ nof intervened in ease no 'M-IO1 )IX(> wen" no! parties to the 
stipulation or the resulting Decree of Divorce, and therefore their continuing custod) of K oi y 
was based upon the temporary custody awarded to them in case no 944400287. R, at 364-65, 
1
 While Father had voluntarily sent the Ihornocks financial support for Kory on several 
prior occasions, for varying amounts of time, this was the first time Father had been under court 
order to pay child support for Kory. 
5 
On October 9, 1997 Father filed a Verified Petition Modifying Decree of Divorce 
alleging that he had been refused visitation with Kory and requesting custody, as he was no 
longer in the military and had established himself in the community. R. at 29-39. 
On January 20, 1998 the Fourth District Court consolidated case no. 944400287 into case 
no. 964401886. R.at54. 
A bench trial was held in this matter on September 29, 1999 and the trial court ruled from 
the bench that (a) a change of circumstances had occurred allowing modification of the Decree 
(R. at 142); (b) the parental presumption was rebutted (R. at 142); and (c) custody of Kory would 
remain with the Thornocks (R. at 142), subject to Father's visitation per statute (R. at 142) and 
Mother's and Father's rights to access all medical records, school events and school records and 
payment of one-half of Kory's medical expenses (R. at 142). 
On April 25, 2000 the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding 
that the parental presumption was applicable to the facts of this case but had been rebutted. R. at 
177. A Final Order was also entered on April 25, 2000. R. at 180-81. 
On May 22, 2000 Father filed a Notice of Appeal from the Final Order. R. at 182-84. 
C. Statement of Facts. The facts of this case are significantly intertwined with the 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, as set forth above. The record is limited to the 
proceedings below, plus the trial at which only one witness, the custody evaluator, testified and 
at which only two exhibits, the Child Custody Evaluation and Addendum, were submitted.2 R. at 
368, p. 62, line 20; p. 63, line 25. 
Kory, the minor child in this matter, was born to Father and Mother on September 24, 
1992 in the State of Utah while Father was deployed in Spain by the U.S. Navy. Father, Mother 
and Kory moved to California in December 1992 when Father was stationed in California. At 
that time Father became Kory's primary caretaker. R. at 256. 
Father was subsequently deployed to Guam in July 1993 despite his attempts to avoid 
redeployment because of his responsibilities as Kory's primary caretaker. In October 1993, 
2
 The Child Custody Evaluation and its subsequent Addendum were sealed and were not 
part of the record on appeal made by the trial court. Pursuant to stipulation by counsel, these 
documents were obtained from the trial court and are included in the Addendum. 
6 
Mother had her telephone disconnec.-. *• •••*»•.: hild 
Custody Evaluation (hereafter "Evaluation" * a. lat same month the State < .•! 
contacted the Thornocks, residents of Utah, and advised them that Kory was about to be placed 
in foster can: ha. au.se ol Mother's severe and chronic neglect of Kory. : ,.: *v* inic^ 18-28; R. 
al 257, lines I 1 Inicrvcnor Ck» *.., .*.-*• • / --« u d brought Korv home *i 
Utah. Evaluation at 5. Father was i. .. i iiu: ••! ifiesee\en:^ if 
time he was still subject to deployment by the I S \ a \ y and therefore agreed to allow 
ThoiTinekK to continue to care for Kory until his scheduled return fn m Guam in Februan vf 
1W4 K, at 2.^ 5 :--:sS-7. 
. An Order to Show Cause Hearing was : w . 
stipulated to the dismissal of their divorce act uu >< ai ; ! * '• * * » t September -. :v,t * He 
1hornocks filed an Objection to Order of Dismissal l< at ; ! 1 -22 Between the time the 
Thornocks were awarded temporary custody of Kory on September 23, 1994 and the time Father 
was honorably discharged i-on 'iw \.*\ \ Father i epeatedl> made I iiisiiccessfi.il applications for a 
hardship discharge in order to care for Kory, R. at 368, p. 29, lines 8-20; p 41, lines 1-8; 
Evaluation at I 1 \ significant factor in the denial of those applications was that Kory was not 
then in htttier's pin Meal custodv ('hild Custody Addendum (hereafter "Addendum5 at 
While stationed m die U n i t e d S t a t e s , • • *•"'• ! : t - <ih us pos.^Me n- v e k M-. 
Evaluation at 4. k-K : 0. I lowever, Father's attempts ;o \ IMI • •  •::* \» -. »e * •* ai ,, 
Thornocks to such an extent that Father was rarely allowed to visit Kory more than < CL during a 
week-long leave, and was not allowed to take Kor> overnight. R. at 368, p. • , afes 12-24 
in aiuation al 4, «>, 10. 
Father again filed tor divorce a w. 
The Thornocks' obstruction of Father's visitation with Kory continued throughout the di\ orce 
proceedings, and Father and Mother entered into a Stipulation on February 20, 1997 wherein 
the) alh^ed I IT >iiiocks J-
 t-J ^iod\ oi V m- bin established Father's right to regular 
visitation under the Pima < - * a • •. . S Che Stipulation and the subsequent 
Decree of Divorce made no difference in the Thornocks' conduct and attitude tow an Is I alhei •. 
efforts at visitation, and Father filed a Verified Petition to Modify on October 9, 1997 wherein he 
7 
stated that visitation had been denied him. R. at 29-39. The Thomocks had never been a party to 
the divorce action, and Father filed a Motion to Consolidate the 1994 action for divorce with the 
1996 action wherein the parties were divorced. R. at 40-41. The actions were consolidated and 
on December 8, 1997, Thomocks filed an Amended Answer and Counterpetition denying 
custody should be transferred to Father and asking for increased child support. R. at 49-51. 
On December 4, 1997, an Order to Show Cause Hearing was held before the Honorable 
Steven L. Hansen and thereafter, amidst objections and exchanges between counsel, an Order on 
Order to Show Cause Hearing was entered on January 20, 1998. R. at 55. In that Order, 
temporary custody was to remain with the Thomocks, intervenors, and the Thomocks were 
ordered to refrain from calling the Petitioner by his given name in the presence of the minor 
child, and to refer to him as "Father" or "Dad." R. at 54. The Thomocks were also ordered to 
"allow the minor child access to any toys and photo albums that [Father] has provided to the 
minor child." R. at 55-93. 
The Court also ordered that a child custody evaluation be done with psychological 
evaluation included and that the parties "shall agree to an evaluator within ten (10) days from the 
date of the hearing herein." R. at 53-54. Between January 20,1998 and September 1998, Father 
and Thomocks, through counsel, continued to haggle over the Order on Order to Show Cause 
Hearing and then over the appointment of an evaluator. 
The Thomocks proposed that Jay Jensen be appointed as the evaluator, but Mr. Jensen 
was not acceptable to Father because he did not accept Father's insurance. R. at 78. On March 
19, 1998, counsel for Father entered an Affidavit with the Court wherein she stated that she had 
on numerous occasions attempted to work with the Thomocks' attorney to obtain agreement on a 
custody evaluator and that she believe[d] "that Intervenors' failure to agree to the evaluator 
suggested by Father and the continued delays in obtaining a conference call [with the Court] and 
to resolve this matter is just more attempts to delay this matter." R. at 78-79. Dr. Lois 
Dettenmaier was proposed by Father and her extensive credentials supplied to the Thomocks and 
to the Court (R. at 71-76); however, Dr. Dettenmaier was unacceptable to the Thomocks for 
reasons that are not clear in the record. R. at 77-79. 
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On August 18, 1998 the Court entered a Minute Entry wherein the Court "selected Lynn 
M. Jacobson as the evaluator." R. at 91. On January 28, 1999 the Thomocks, through counsel, 
entered a Statement Opting Out Of ADR Program (R. at 96-98), along with a Request for 
Settlement Conference wherein they certified that the case was at issue and ready for trial. R. at 
95. A Settlement Conference was scheduled for March 19,1999 and then continued by the 
Thomocks to March 25, 1999 before the Honorable Judge Gary Stott. R. at 103. The Minutes 
Pretrial Conference entered by the Court on March 25,1999 indicate that Mr. Jacobson "has 
questions on the issue of child custody" and that as the "parties have not received the 
evaluation...they are requesting a continuance of this hearing for one month." R. at 104. The 
hearing was rescheduled for May 4, 1999. Id. 
The Court entered Minutes after the review hearing on May 4, 1999 scheduling trial for 
August 3-4 and stating that "The Court would be inclined to speak with the child if the parties 
agree and if it is one on one with the child." R. at 109. 
Further haggling apparently took place between counsel as on June 18, 1999, counsel for 
the Thomocks filed a Notice of Deposition on Father for the 22nd of July, 1999. R. at 114. On 
July 15, 1999 counsel for Father filed an Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Notice of 
Deposition, stating that not only had there been plenty of time to conduct discovery in this case 
that had been pending for several months but noted that counsel for the Thomocks had scheduled 
the deposition after talking with her [counsel for Father] and being advised that she had 
scheduling conflicts on the day set for depositions. R. at 118-119. Father also filed a Motion to 
Compel Discovery on July 15, 1999, alleging that subpoenas served on or about the 1st day of 
June had not been responded to by the Thomocks. R. at 120-121. 
On July 29, 1999 Father's new attorney entered a Notice of Appearance but made no 
request to continue the trial set for August 3-4, 1999. R. at 127. On July 30, 1999 counsel for 
the Thomocks entered a Motion to Continue Trial based on the severe illness of her husband. R. 
at 128-132. Counsel for Father made no objection, and trial was continued to September 29-30, 
1999. R. at 134. 
Lynn Jacobson, a Certified Social Worker licensed by the State of Utah (R. at 368, p. 5, 
lines 21-22) submitted a Child Custody Evaluation dated December 28,1998, wherein he 
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attempted "to identify the custodial arrangement that will provide the greatest opportunity for 
Kory to succeed in the socialization process and become a productive member of society." 
Evaluation at 1. The Evaluation concluded that "physical and legal custody of Kory should 
remain with [Thornocks]" because "Travis [sic] has been in the care of his grandparents for the 
past five years. He has never known a home other than the one he now resides in. To summarily 
transfer custody to Travis would be a very difficult adjustment for Kory." Evaluation at 14. No 
psychological tests or objective assessments of any type were utilized by Mr. Jacobson in his 
custody evaluation. R. at 368, p. 10, lines 3-16; p. 12, lines 12-21. The evaluation made no 
mention whatsoever of the three Hutchison factors as such, though Mr. Jacobson did find that 
Kory had a stronger bond with the Thornocks than with Father and noted that "[Kory] has not 
had the opportunity to develop a bond with his father... [but] [g]iven the opportunity to bond 
more fully with his father he would most likely develop a closer bond and a more normal 
father/son relationship." Evaluation at 7. 
On February 22, 1999, pursuant to agreement of counsel, the Thornocks' attorney sent 
Mr. Jacobson a letter stating that "Inasmuch as you have recommended that custody should be 
awarded to the grandparents, I believe the court might by [sic] interested in an analysis by you to 
show that Travis Davis lacks all three of the characteristics that give rise to parental 
presumption," and providing a list of the Hutchison factors and a copy of State ex rel. M.W.. 970 
P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), aff d in part and rev'd in part 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000). R. at 368, 
p. 49, line 8; p. 51, line 25. 
Mr. Jacobson submitted an Addendum to the custody evaluation on March 17, 1998 [sic] 
wherein he attempted to address factors relating to rebuttal of the parental presumption and set 
forth preliminary conclusions, which included the following: 
1. Travis now has a stable and secure marriage. He has matured and now realizes how 
much he loves Kory and wants him to be a part of his new family. Travis has a strong 
bond with his son and Kory recognizes Travis as his father. Addendum at 1. 
2. The willingness Travis is now demonstrating to sacrifice his own interest for that of Kory 
in [sic] noble and admirable but decidedly belated. Id. at 2. 
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3. Travis has demonstrated sympathy and understanding of Kory's needs in the recent past.. 
. . He does have the "sympathy and understanding" for Kory that is usually characteristic 
of parents in general but this quality is of recent origin He is a very good father to 
the children in his present family and has demonstrated the ability to be sensitive to their 
needs for age appropriate sympathy and understanding. Id. 
4. There is no question that [Travis] loves his son and wants to resume his role as Kory's 
father. He has the capacity to meet Kory's needs in the future Id. 
The Addendum concluded that "Travis does not appear to have demonstrated the 
"Hutchinson factors" with regard to Kory over the duration of his son's childhood. There is no 
question that he loves his son . . . [and] has the capacity to meet Kory's needs in the future . . . 
[but] Kory has established a parent/child bond with [the Thornocks] and it would not be in his 
best interest to disrupt this bond at this time." Addendum at 2. 
Trial took place on September 29, 1999. The parties stipulated that Judge Stott talk to the 
minor child Kory, then age 6, in chambers and off the record, and without the presence of 
counsel. The Thornocks, whose burden it was to rebut the parental presumption in favor of 
Father, called no witnesses. Father's counsel called the custody evaluator, who was the only 
witness at trial. In his testimony, Mr. Jacobson admitted that the vast majority of his report was 
based on hearsay statements. R. at 368, p. 16, lines 17-25; p. 17, lines 1-7; p. 18, lines 24-25; p. 
19, lines 1-4; p. 40, lines 2-25; p. 41, lines 1-11; p. 52, lines 2-25; p. 53, lines 1-19. The only 
exhibits introduced were Mr. Jacobson's Evaluation and Addendum. 
Following Mr. Jacobson's testimony, the trial court advised counsel that, "unless you are 
capable of presenting something to me that's going to change my mind, I am prepared to rule 
now and tell you what my opinion is with regard to the custody question." R. at 368, p. 65, lines 
3-10. Father's attorney expressed concern that the basis of the Court's decision relied so much 
on hearsay, and indicated she was prepared to show the Court that many of the issues on which 
Mr. Jacobson had based his report were not as he perceived them. R. at 368, p. 65, lines 15-21. 
Judge Stott responded by stating that he did not consider those matters to be significant factors in 
determining what he believed should be done with respect to custody. R. at 368, p. 65, lines 22-
25; p. 66, lines 1-10. 
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In a ruling from the bench, the Court then stated its findings and concluded that Father's 
parental presumption had been rebutted. The Thornocks were awarded custody of Kory, subject 
to Father's right to exercise statutory visitation, Mother's and Father's rights to access all 
medical records, school events and school records, and Mother's and Father's obligation to each 
pay one-half of Kory's medical expenses. R. at 142. 
Summary of Arguments 
The trial court's findings of fact, as based upon the record, are clearly erroneous in that 
such findings are insufficiently detailed to allow the reviewing court to assure that the trial 
court's decision flows logically from both the evidence and the controlling legal principles. 
The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to rebut the parental presumption in favor 
of Father and was insufficient to support the Final Order awarding custody to the minor child's 
maternal grandparents. 
The trial court impermissibly gave up its judicial responsibility and abused its discretion 
by essentially adopting the admittedly hearsay-based conclusions and recommendations of the 
custody evaluator without any evidence of hard facts to support those conclusions. 
The "particular point in time" referred to in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 
(Utah 1982) should not be an arbitrarily determined factor, but should refer specifically to the 
time of custody determination. This is the point at which a decision must be made, and it is the 
circumstances existing at this point in time that are relevant. 
The parental presumption cannot properly be rebutted on the basis of a parent not being 
continuously present in his child's life, when such absence was due to circumstances beyond the 
parent's control. 
Father's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of his child 
was violated by the trial court's award of custody to the child's grandparents without first 
showing a legitimate, let alone a compelling, government interest. 
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Argument 
A. The trial court's findings of fact, as based upon the record, are clearly erroneous in 
that such findings are insufficiently detailed to allow the reviewing court to assure 
that the trial court's decision flows logically from both the evidence and the 
controlling legal principles. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in a bench trial such as the one 
in the court below, "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon . . . " Rule 52, U.R.CP. This appellate court has had many opportunities to address 
this rule and has uniformly held that: 
[T]o permit appropriate appellate review of a trial court's application of the law, 
the trial court must have made adequate factual findings. The findings should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
Allred v. Mired 835 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
The Findings of Fact entered in this action were the subject of considerable dispute 
between the parties, as counsel for Thornocks and counsel for Father attempted to incorporate the 
language used by the trial court in its ruling from the bench. R. at 148-152; 157-170. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on April 25, 2000 are therefore as 
comprehensive and consistent as possible with the trial court's oral findings and conclusions. 
The Court found that the parental presumption was in place and that finding is not 
challenged on appeal. The Court then ruled that the parental presumption was rebutted and, in 
support for that ruling, made individual findings on each of "the three considerations, as 
referenced by Mr. Jacobson" [the Hutchison factors] and concluded that "the evidence weighs 
against [Father] on all three issues." R. 175-76. That ruling and those findings are being 
challenged in this appeal. 
In addressing the first Hutchison factor, the Court found there was not a strong mutual 
bond existing now or in the past between Father and Kory. R. at 176. The Court stated that 
"[t]his has been true for a number of years while Mr. Davis was away and his son has been in the 
United States." Id. The Court further found that "Kory loves his father and recognizes Travis as 
his father He sees Sandy and George Thornock as Grandpa and Grandma, and sometimes as 
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Mom and Dad." Id. Despite finding that Kory loves his father, the Court concluded that Kory 
"does not have a strong mutual bond with his father. A strong mutual bond would be necessary to 
take him out of the situation he is in now. Historically, and presently, it does not exist." Id. 
While the Court acknowledged that there is a bond between Kory and his father (R. at 
175), it failed to address Mr. Jacobson's concern, supported by years of legal wrangling, that "the 
Thornocks have made a conscious effort to shield Kory from contact with his father in the hope 
that [Father] would simply give up his efforts to regain custody or have a father and son 
relationship." R. at 368, p. 41, lines 12-24; Evaluation at 13-14. The Findings do not mention Mr. 
Jacobson's concern that the Thornocks hampered the development of the bond by obstructing and 
denying visitation, particularly when Father's opportunities to see Kory were minimal due to the 
determination of the U.S. Navy as to where Father would be assigned. Likewise, the Findings do 
not address Mr. Jacobson's opinion that, ,f[g]iven the opportunity to bond more fully with his 
father, [Kory] would most likely develop a closer bond and a more normal father/son relationship." 
Evaluation at 7. 
In the case of Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888, 893 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Utah Court 
of Appeals found that such considerations were relevant in determining whether the parental 
presumption had been rebutted. However, the trial court in the instant case gives no indication that 
it even considered those factors. The Court could have determined such considerations to be 
irrelevant, but the appellate court is left with no map, no way of determining what evidence the 
trial court used to adduce what facts, and no way to follow the path of logic taken by the Court 
from evidence to conclusion. The Findings are thus insufficient, and the parental presumption was 
not rebutted and remains in place. 
Despite the precision of the Court's findings on the strength of the acknowledged bond 
between father and son, the Court made no reference to any underlying evidence and gave no 
subsidiary facts which would allow the appellate court to follow its reasoning from evidence to 
conclusion. Though the Court referred to "findings," in reality it made no actual findings of fact 
but rather reached conclusions and then denominated those conclusions as findings. The trial 
court's finding that the first of the three Hutchison considerations have been met is thus clearly 
erroneous and cannot stand. Consequently, the finding that the three Hutchison factors have been 
14 
rebutted, as well as the ultimate finding that Father's parental presumption has been rebutted, must 
be reversed. 
The Court also found that the second Hutchison factor, whether the parent has 
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his personal interest and welfare for the benefit of the child, 
"weighed against Father." R. at 176. The Court stated that in order to properly address this factor, 
it was necessary to look at "[a] total consideration of the historical information." Id. The 
subsidiary findings that Father "made little or no concerted effort to contest the Court's initial 
decision to award custody of Kory to Mr. and Mrs. Thornock," and then voluntarily gave custody 
to the grandparents," (id.) were conclusory and made no reference to the underlying evidence on 
which the Court relied in reaching that conclusion. While the Court noted that it had considered 
the historical information, "the steps by which the ultimate conclusion . . . was reached" are 
unclear and the findings thus clearly erroneous. Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). The Thornocks bore the burden of rebutting the parental presumption, but presented no 
evidence at trial as to Father's failure to demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice for his child. The 
Court failed to specify whether, in making this finding, it relied on the hearsay statements and 
conclusions of the custody evaluator, Mr. Jacobson; on a review of documents in the proceedings 
below; or on Judge Stott's brief interview with Kory. 
If the Court was relying on Mr. Jacobson, did the Court give any weight to his statement 
that "[t]he willingness Travis is now demonstrating to sacrifice his own interest for that of Kory in 
[sic] noble and admirable . . . " (Addendum at 2), or did the Court consider conclusive Jacobson's 
observation that "Travis does not appear to have been willing to sacrifice his own welfare for that 
of Kory during Kory's very early formative years" (id.)? As the Utah Supreme Court's most recent 
recitation of the Hutchison factors looks at those characteristics solely in the present tense, see 
State ex rel. M.W., 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000), the weight placed on those statements by the trial court 
is crucial and yet undeterminable. 
If, on the other hand, the Court's finding was based on the little information available on 
the proceedings below, did the Court even consider Father's futile attempts to first obtain custody 
and then his years of court battles in which he has had to engage in order to even be allowed to see 
his son? Did the Court consider the fact that this whole sorry story would never have occurred if 
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Father had not made a decision that was clearly in the best interest of his son at the time, to allow 
the Thornocks to continue to care for the child on a temporary basis while Father was subject to 
deployment abroad by the United States Navy -after the Thornocks had taken possession of Kory 
rather than allow him to be taken as a ward of the State of California? R. at 254-255. Did the 
Court properly address Father's willingness to sacrifice for his child, or did the Court consider only 
the results of his efforts? Did the trial court consider all the evidence relevant to a demonstration 
of Father's willingness to sacrifice his personal interest and welfare for Kory's benefit, or did the 
Thornocks even present any such evidence? Did the trial court properly place the burden of 
rebutting the parental presumption on the Thornocks, or was the burden of defending that 
presumption improperly placed on Father? All of these questions are relevant and answers are 
necessary in order to determine whether or not the Court's Findings and Final Order constitute an 
abuse of discretion. 
The Findings of Fact presented orally and then entered by the Court below do not flow 
logically from the evidence and provide no information on those crucial points. "If sufficient 
findings are not made, we must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to 
allow us to apply the . . . factors as a matter of law on appeal." Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 492 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Because the trial Court failed to provide the requisite map leading from the 
underlying facts to its findings and conclusions, those findings and conclusions are clearly 
erroneous and the parental presumption remains in place. 
In addressing the third Hutchison factor, the Court found that Father "lacks a tendency to be 
more sympathetic and understanding of the child than anyone else." R. at 175 (emphasis added). 
As argued in Section B, infra, this finding is not consistent with controlling legal principles 
prohibiting a non-parent from rebutting this element simply by comparing the sympathy and 
understanding demonstrated by the parent with that demonstrated by the non-parent. Hutchison 
requires that, to rebut the parental presumption, the non-parent must show that "the parent lacks the 
sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents generally." Hutchison, 
649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982). Though the court "found" that Father "lacks a tendency," in actuality 
this finding is a conclusion of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Without the 
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necessary factual underpinnings, however, there is no way to determine whether this determination 
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
Again, the Court fails to provide any information as to what facts or evidence were relied 
upon in making this finding. Mr. Jacobson stated that "Travis has demonstrated sympathy and 
understanding of Kory's needs in the recent past. . . ." and that "[h]e does have the 'sympathy and 
understanding' for Kory that is usually characteristic of parents in general." Addendum at 2. In 
analyzing this factor, did the Court reject Mr. Jacobson's statements while accepting his 
conclusions? Did the Court read between the lines of Mr. Jacobson's report, or base its finding on 
its interview with the child or on the Court's innate knowledge of the mind and feelings and needs 
of a six year old child? Again, the trial court provided no answers to those questions. Since the 
Court failed to provide findings "sufficiently detailed to ensure that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based" (Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted)), the parental presumption remains in place and custody of the minor child must 
be returned to his Father. 
The Court's finding regarding the third Hutchison characteristic again fails to provide the 
crucial logical flow from the evidence. In addition, this finding is internally lacking. Although the 
Court states that "Kory needs a relationship with his father, mother, and grandparents, but most of 
all, Kory needs to know where he belongs" (R. 368, p. 77, lines 9-10), the Court not only fails to 
make clear what underlying facts were relied on in determining the child's needs, but also failed to 
make clear why the child would not know where he belonged if custody were awarded to Father. 
Furthermore, the Court provides absolutely no basis for the finding that "[the child's] mental and 
emotional well-being depend on [knowing where he belongs]." R. 368, p. 77, lines 10-14. In 
addition, the Court apparently failed to consider the feasibility of making a gradual change of 
custody in order to minimize the effect on Kory, as proposed by Father's attorney at trial. R. at 
368, p. 43, lines 13-25; p. 44, lines 1-11. 
In considering this factor, the Court concluded that "[t]he father's actions have spoken 
louder than words to the child, and the child does not feel the father is understanding of his needs. 
The child needs time to be convinced that his father loves him." Id. Again, the Court fails to 
provide its reasoning from evidence, to fact, to conclusion. Several possibilities are available. 
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Perhaps the child in chambers told the Court that he does not feel Father is understanding; perhaps 
the Court concluded that this six year old boy should be the judge of Father's understanding. The 
Court may be acquainted with a similar situation, and assumed the underlying facts - and thus the 
feelings and awareness of the child - to be identical in both cases. We can guess and assume what 
evidence the Court relied on, and we can guess at the logical connection between the facts deduced 
from that evidence and the findings of the Court. An appellate court, however, does not guess and 
assume. The requisite details have not been provided, and the Court's findings are therefore 
clearly erroneous and the Final Order resulting from those findings must be reversed. 
In Roberts v. Roberts, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "[sjpecificity of findings is 
particularly important in custody determinations [because] the issues involved are highly fact 
sensitive." 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Roberts court also held that "findings 
must be adequate to ensure on appeal that the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based" and that "to ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and 
reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions." 
Id. at 195 (citations omitted). As important as these issues are in custody cases in general, they are 
even more important in this case where Father's constitutional interest in raising his own child is at 
stake. The trial court's findings are inadequate and it is impossible to determine how the trial court 
reached its final legal conclusion. "Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues 
is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontro verted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of judgment," and the findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached." Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202-203 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Acton 
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added). The findings are thus clearly 
erroneous and the resulting Final Order must be reversed, granting custody of Kory to his father, 
the appellant. 
"Whenever custody is contested and evidence presents several possible interpretations, a 
bare conclusory recitation of factors and statutory terms will not suffice." Woodward v. Fazzio, 
823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). We must have the necessary 
supporting factual findings. The trial court's conclusory findings make no reference to the 
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underlying "hard facts" that must give rise to acceptable findings. The court must provide an 
account of actual facts supporting the ultimate conclusions. Instead, as in Woodward, the findings 
below were "conclusory, akin to conclusions of law." Id. 
This case has a dearth of hard facts, and the little "evidence" available consists only of 
unsupported conclusions based on unverified hearsay statements made by people the Thornocks 
could have called to testify at trial. The trial court should have been well aware that it was 
committing error by making findings and conclusions based on nothing more substantial than this, 
particularly on an issue of such import as rebuttal of the parental presumption. This, in addition to 
the obvious fact that Father has been deprived of his substantial rights in parenting and having 
custody of his son, makes the court's actions "plain error" (State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah 1989)) and requires a reversal by the appellate court. 
B. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to rebut the parental presumption in 
favor of Father and was insufficient to support the Final Order awarding custody to 
the minor child's maternal grandparents and so must be reversed, awarding Father 
custody of Kory. 
There is a presumption applied by Utah courts, when confronted with custody disputes 
between parents and non-parents, that it is in the child's best interest to be in the custody of a 
natural parent. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). In the instant case, the trial 
court found that Father was entitled to the parental presumption. R. at 177. This finding is not 
challenged on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently had occasion to address the importance of the parental 
presumption, and reiterated the factors involved in rebutting that presumption as it stated that: 
. . . to rebut the parental presumption, a non-parent must prove that (1) the strong 
mutual bond parent and child normally share does not exist, (2) the parent will not 
sacrifice his or her personal interests or welfare for the child, and (3) the parent does 
not have the sympathy for and understanding of the child that a parent 
characteristically would. If a non-parent can rebut the presumption, the parent and 
the non-parent will then stand on equal ground in the custody dispute, which will be 
decided based on the best interest of the child. 
State ex rel. M.W.. 12 P.3d 80, 83 (Utah 2000). 
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While cases involving an initial award of custody are often necessarily decided on a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, simply because someone has to get custody and frequently 
neither party can present enough evidence to meet a "clear and convincing" standard, this is not the 
case when a biological parent is pitted against a third party. As the Utah Supreme Court stated 
long ago, the parental presumption "should be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence." 
In Re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 857 (Utah 1981). As grandparents claiming custody over a biological 
parent, Thornocks had the burden of proof at trial to present clear and convincing evidence that the 
strong mutual bond parent and child normally share does not exist between Father and child; that 
Father will not sacrifice his or her personal interests or welfare for the child; and that Father does 
not have the sympathy for and understanding of the child that a parent characteristically would. It 
is evident from the oral ruling made by Judge Stott that he misunderstood that standard as he stated 
his "finding" that "all of the [Hutchison] factors weigh in favor of the Thornocks for the custody 
of Kory." R. at 368, p. 73, lines 10-17 (emphasis added). 
The evidence supporting the finding of the trial court is sparse indeed. The Thornocks 
presented no evidence at trial, and they filed no affidavit or verified pleadings on which the Court 
could have relied. The only possible basis for the Court's finding is the testimony of the one 
witness at trial, Mr. Jacobson, along with his Custody Evaluation and Addendum, and the off the 
record interview with the six year old child whose custody is at issue. 
In support of the Court's finding that the first of the Hutchison factors was rebutted, Mr. 
Jacobson testified that he "believe[d] that [Kory] does have a stronger bond with his-his 
grandparents. He turns to them for support, seeks their approval more so than he did his father, at 
the time." R. at 368, p. 20, line 25; p. 21, lines 1-3. Mr. Jacobson also testified that "there is a 
bond there [between Father and Kory], it is not a mutual bond. I think Kory's [sic] bond with his 
son is much stronger than Kory's bond with his father." Id., p. 55, lines 16-24. In his evaluation, 
Mr. Jacobson's only statements supportive of the Court's finding in regards to bonding were that 
"Kory is more closely bonded to his grandparents because they have been the primary caretakers in 
his life for as long as he can remember"(Evaluation at 6-7) and his conclusion that "[t]his 
evaluator's interviews and observations with Kory suggest that he is attached and bonded to his 
grandparents more so than to his father and stepmother." Evaluation at 8. As support for the 
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Court's finding that the Addendum indicated no strong mutual bond between Father and Kory, 
which Addendum was completed by Mr. Jacobson for the specific purpose of addressing the 
Hutchison factors, is Mr. Jacobson's conclusion that "[t]he normal bonding and attachment process 
between the parents and their child was disrupted by Elizabeth's physical and emotional neglect of 
Kory and by [Father's] physical absence from Kory's life for the past six years" (Addendum at 1), 
and that "Kory's parent/child bond is with the Thornocks who are the only people he has ever 
know [sic] as parents. He enjoys visiting with his father but his 'home' is with the Thornocks." 
Addendum at 1. 
In addition, the Court could have obtained information from Kory that supported its finding 
that no strong mutual bond exists between father and son. 
The Hutchison factors are not intended to be comparative, and the parental presumption 
"cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the opposing party . . . has established a deeper 
bond with the child . . . " Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982). If we eliminate 
Mr. Jacobson's conclusions regarding the relative bonding of Kory with Thornocks and Father, we 
are left with his conclusions that the normal bonding and attachment process between Father and 
son were disrupted; that Father's bond with his son is much stronger than Kory's bond with his 
father; and that Kory loves his father. Considering the basis for Mr. Jacobson's conclusions, 
namely one half hour observation of Father and Kory together along with unspecified and 
unsubstantiated hearsay statements from various persons who generally had a vested interest in 
minimizing the bond between Father and his son, there is certainly not enough evidence to support 
the finding of the Court, particularly considering the importance of this issue. 
The evidence supporting the finding of the trial court is so lacking that it is rendered wholly 
inadequate. It should indeed be of grave concern that a matter as weighty as the custody of a child, 
made even weightier by the question of rebuttal of the parental presumption, should be decided on 
such a flimsy basis. The Thornocks had the burden of rebutting the parental presumption, and yet 
they put on no evidence at trial. That should have been the end of the matter, with custody being 
awarded to Father. Instead, the Court somehow accepted Mr. Jacobson's conclusions based on 
hearsay from family members and associates, whom one would expect to be biased, without one 
shred of sworn testimony relating to any underlying facts. 
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While the Utah Supreme Court has noted that "it is to be assumed that [the Court] has and 
will use his superior knowledge as to the competency and the effect which should be given 
evidence," Super Tire Mkt, Inc. v. Rollins. 417 P.2d 132 (Utah 1966), the Court in this case vastly 
misjudged the competency and effect of the information available to it. The "evidence" presented 
at trial does not and cannot support the trial court's findings, and the trial court's decision should 
therefore be reversed and custody should be awarded to Father. 
C. The trial court impermissibly gave up its judicial responsibility and abused its 
discretion by essentially adopting the admittedly hearsay-based conclusions and 
recommendations of the custody evaluator without any evidence of hard facts to 
support those conclusions. 
When applying an abuse of discretion standard, which is the appropriate standard of review 
for this issue, "the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate 
findings and conclusions." Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations 
omitted). As argued in Sections A and B, supra, the Findings entered by the trial court are 
inadequately supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
Rule 3-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration states that "[i]t is the duty and 
responsibility of individual judges to manage their court responsibilities consistently with the 
administrative goals of the Council and the fair and efficient administration of justice." Upon 
conclusion of Mr. Jacobson's testimony, the Court summarily advised counsel for the parties that 
he was prepared to rule on the custody issue. R. at 368, p. 65, lines 3-10. The Court disregarded 
concerns raised by Father's attorney regarding the need to present additional evidence in response 
to the hearsay statements which riddled Mr. Jacobson's reports and testimony, and which 
influenced his recommendation to the Court. R. at 368, p. 65, lines 15-25; p. 66, lines 1-10. While 
the Court did indicate that it was willing to accept additional testimony (R. at 368, p. 67, lines 2-7), 
the Court had made it apparent to the parties and counsel that the Court had already decided how it 
would rule on the custody issue. Under such circumstances it would not only have been a waste of 
time and money for Father to go forward, but it would have been "shooting in the dark" as no 
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evidence had been presented concerning his lack of the requisite parenting factors, no prima facie 
case for him to disprove. 
The Court had thus based its decision on hearsay evidence from two unreliable sources: (a) 
the Court's personal interview with the six-year-old child, in chambers and off the record, and (b) 
the opinions and conclusions of Mr. Jacobson, which were based upon extremely limited actual 
observation by Mr. Jacobson and relied heavily upon unsupported statements made by the parties 
and other relatives. The Court not only erred in failing to consider evidence controverting Mr. 
Jacobson's conclusions, evidence that was no more flimsy than that upon which the Court decided 
the case, but therefore impermissibly surrendered its judicial obligation as it rubberstamped the 
conclusions made by Mr. Jacobson as to the ultimate issues in this case. The Court instead chose 
to issue a ruling based upon the subjective perceptions of a six-year-old child and the hearsay-
based recommendations of the court-appointed evaluator. The Final Order entered by the Court is 
unjust and inequitable, and the trial court abused its discretion in basing its decision on evidence 
insufficient to support the Findings of Fact and the Final Order. 
D. The "particular point in time" referred to in the Hutchison case should not be an 
arbitrarily determined factor, but should refer specifically to the time of custody 
determination. This is the point at which a decision must be made, and it is the 
circumstances existing at this point in time that are relevant. 
The Hutchison case holds that the parental presumption can only be rebutted by evidence 
establishing that a particular parent at a particular time generally lacks all three of the 
characteristics that give rise to the presumption. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41. One of the issues 
raised by Father on appeal is whether it is appropriate for courts to arbitrarily determine at what 
particular point in time the court should evaluate the natural parent's satisfaction of the Hutchison 
factors. The particular point in time specified by Hutchison has not been clearly defined by Utah 
courts, although it has been addressed somewhat peripherally in several cases. 
The language used by the Utah Supreme Court in Hutchison when identifying the elements 
needed to rebut the parental presumption, and used by Utah courts in some subsequent custody 
cases involving parents and non-parents, consists of present tense in the first and third elements, 
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and past tense in the second element. The "particular period in time" has been discussed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State in re J.M.. 940 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of State ex rel. M.W.. 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000). 
One of the arguments raised in J.M. by the natural father was that, even if the parental 
presumption had been adequately rebutted at trial, it was in the child's best interest to be placed in 
the father's care. The Court of Appeals stated that this argument "fails to recognize the trial 
court's findings were in present tense, as well as past tense, and were based on recent evidence, as 
well as less recent evidence." Id. at 533. The appellate court went on to say: 
Certainly some of the findings and evidence relate to the period before [the father] 
acknowledged paternity and tried to become involved in [the child's] life. Even so, 
those findings and evidence are also important in supporting the trial court's 
decision that [the father's] parental presumption was rebutted at the time of trial: 
They show the underlying reason why the relationship between [father] and [child], 
at the time of trial, lacked closeness, sympathy and understanding, and lacked a 
sense of [the father's] willingness to sacrifice for [his child]. 
Id. at 533-34. 
In M.W., the Utah Supreme Court determined that a father was not entitled to the parental 
presumption because his children had previously been adjudicated neglected. Nonetheless, the 
analysis used in M.W. is relevant here with respect to the Supreme Court's evaluation of three 
Hutchison factors. When setting forth these factors, the Supreme Court uses the present tense for 
all three: 
We determined in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), that to rebut 
the parental presumption, a non-parent must prove that (1) the strong mutual bond 
parent and child normally share does not exist, (2) the parent will not sacrifice his or 
her personal interest or welfare for the child, and (3) the parent does not have the 
sympathy for and understanding of the child that a parent characteristically would. 
M.W., 12 P.3d at 83. The case of M.W. may well have resolved this issue regarding the meaning 
of the phrase "at a particular point in time." However, it is not clear whether M.W. is absolutely 
definitive on this matter and it is therefore appropriate to present argument regarding the trial 
court's analysis below. 
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In the present case, the trial court summarized the Hutchison test for the parties and stated 
its belief that the phrase "at a particular time" is "significant in this case." R. at 368, p. 71, lines 5-
11. However, the Court did not specify the particular point in time upon which it based its 
decision, nor did the Court elucidate on the significance thereof. Mr. Jacobson has found that 
Father has recently satisfied all the Hutchison requirements. Addendum at 1 (stating that Father 
has a strong bond with his son and Kory recognizes Travis as his father); id. at 2 (stating that 
Travis is now demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice his own interest for that of Kory, and that 
Travis "has demonstrated sympathy and understanding of Kory's needs in the recent past" and 
"does have the 'sympathy and understanding' for Kory that is usually characteristic of parents in 
general"). Mr. Jacobson has found that Father is capable of meeting Kory's needs in the future. 
Id. at 2. 
Given these findings, and given the Court's unquestioning reliance on the only evidence 
before it, i.e., Mr. Jacobson's reports and testimony, it is difficult to understand how the Court 
went from these findings of Mr. Jacobson to the Court's finding that the parental presumption had 
been rebutted. The trial court here, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, found that 
these three considerations had been met "at a particular time" and that the evidence weighed 
against Father on all three issues. R. at 176. 
With respect to the element requiring a strong mutual bond between the parent and child, at 
trial Mr. Jacobson agreed with Father's attorney that Father and Kory have a bond, but stressed 
that this bond was not as strong as the bond with the Thornocks. R. at 368, p. 56, lines 5-9. This 
comparative evaluation is neither sufficient nor proper under the prior cases of Duncan and 
Hutchison. See Duncan, 918 P.2d at 893; see also Hutchison. 649 P.2d at 41. Mr. Jacobson also 
testified that over time, Kory's bond with Father could improve. R. at 368, p. 55, lines 16-21. Mr. 
Jacobson reported that Father "has a strong bond with his son." Addendum at 1. The trial court, 
however, asserted that "Cory's [sic] feelings - this goes to the bond of [the] relationship." R. at 
368, p. 75, lines 8-9. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court did find that 
Kory does have a bond with Father, but determined that this was not as strong as the bond between 
Kory and the Thornocks. R. at 175. The Court ignored the evaluator's concerns that the 
Thornocks had denied or obstructed Father's visitation with his son. Evaluation at 13-14; R. at 
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368, p. 41, lines 12-24. The Court simply concluded "that there is not a strong mutual bond 
existing now or in the past between [Father] and the child." R. at 176; see also R. at 368, p. 74, 
lines 14-18. 
The evidence presented at trial therefore indicates that there is a mutual bond between 
Father and Kory, which could improve over time. The trial court improperly ruled that the 
Thornocks had rebutted this prong of the parental presumption merely by having developed a 
mutual bond between themselves and Kory which was, at the time of trial, stronger than Kory's 
bond with Father. This comparative analysis cannot be used to rebut Father's parental 
presumption, and ignores the current bond between Father and Kory and the potential for 
strengthening the bond in the future. In assessing this Hutchison factor, the Court improperly 
treated the Thornocks equally with Father by comparing the strength of their relationship with 
Kory against Father's relationship with Kory, when such a comparative analysis should not have 
been performed until after the Court determined the Thornocks had successfully rebutted this 
factor. Additionally, the Court disregarded the Thornocks' part in maintaining a disruption in the 
bond between Father and Kory. 
The second element of the parental presumption which must be rebutted by the opposing 
party required the Thornocks to establish that Father has not demonstrated a willingness to 
sacrifice his own interest and welfare for Kory's. The trial court correctly stated that "[a] total 
consideration of the historical information . . . has to be looked at to address this." R. at 176. 
However, the Court gave no weight to Father's early lawsuits in both California and Utah in which 
he, an impoverished seaman, attempted to gain custody of his son. Instead, the Court focused on 
the allegation that Father "made little or no concerted effort to contest the Court's initial decision 
to award custody of Kory to Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. Travis then voluntarily gave custody to the 
grandparents." R. at 175. The Thornocks presented no evidence to support this Finding. The 
Court ignored Father's circumstances at the time with respect to his deployment by the U.S. Navy 
and the fact that Father was not able to take physical custody of Kory at the time in question. The 
Court ignored the conduct of the Thornocks in obstructing visitation between Father and Kory, 
which led Father to agree to custody in order that he might obtain court-ordered visitation. The 
Court ignored Mr. Jacobson's acknowledgment of Father's recently demonstrated willingness to 
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sacrifice his own interest for that of Kory by seeking to make Kory a part of his present family. 
Addendum at 2.3 Thus, the Court focused only on past conditions and failed to consider any 
mitigating circumstances and the present conditions, all of which should have been assessed before 
determining whether this element of Father's parental presumption had been successfully rebutted 
by the Thornocks. 
The final prong of the Hutchison test requires the opposing party to demonstrate that the 
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents 
generally. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court determined that "the 
father lacks a tendency to be more sympathetic and understanding of the child than anyone else." 
R. at 175 (emphasis added). The parental presumption does not allow an opposing party to rebut 
this element simply by comparing the sympathy and understanding demonstrated by the parent 
with that demonstrated by the opposing party. The parties are not on equal footing until after the 
parental presumption has been successfully rebutted. The Court here essentially determined that 
Kory needs to know where he belongs, and Father's efforts to regain custody of Kory demonstrate 
Father's lack of sympathy and understanding of that need. R. at 175. The Court does not address 
the possibility of granting custody to Father and making a gradual transition in order to minimize 
any difficulties Kory may have in leaving his grandparents' home and settling in with his father. 
R. at 368, p. 43, lines 13-25; p. 44, lines 1-11. Instead, the Court simply concludes that it is in 
Kory's best interest and welfare to know that he belongs in the home where he presently is. R. at 
3
 Note the inconsistency in Mr. Jacobson's statement that "[t]he willingness Travis is now 
demonstrating to sacrifice his own interest for that of Kory in [sic] noble and admirable but 
decidedly belated and reflects his own needs rather than those of Kory." Addendum at 2 
(emphasis added). Mr. Jacobson acknowledges Father's current efforts to sacrifice his own 
interest for that of Kory, but then attempts to minimize those efforts by claiming that such efforts 
are not in fact made in consideration of Kory's needs and interest. This is a baldface conclusion 
with no psychological analyses of the needs of either Kory or Father; such an unsupported 
conclusion is understandable in light of Mr. Jacobson's lack of qualifications for performing such 
an analysis. Mr. Jacobson is a certified social worker, not a licensed clinical social worker or 
psychologist, and so is not qualified to address the deeper issues previously considered by Utah 
courts regarding the importance of the parent-child relationship. It seems apparent that Mr. 
Jacobson is attempting to supplement his Child Custody Evaluation in a manner which would 
justify his initial actions and recommendations concerning the best interest of the child. 
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368, p. 77, lines 2-14. Again, the Court ignores Father's recent and current efforts to regain his 
parent-child relationship with Kory. The Court ignores the need of a child for his father. The 
Court ignores the feasibility of making a change of custody in a manner that would reduce the 
effect of transition on Kory, and simply determines that a change of custody at this time is not 
appropriate under any conditions. The Court focuses on Father's past mistakes without according 
any deference to Father's recent and current status as a stable, caring father who is capable and 
desirous of caring for his son, while no evidence was presented regarding the Thornocks' past and 
present mistakes. The Court's conclusion that this aspect of the Hutchison test was adequately 
rebutted is again improperly based on an equal comparison of the Thornocks' current qualifications 
with Father's qualifications as determined by Father's past mistakes, and without first determining 
that Father lacks this Hutchison characteristic. 
In the case at bar, the trial court's statements at trial and Findings of Fact indicate that 
Father's present actions have not been considered or, if they have been considered, they were 
deemed to be of significantly less weight than Father's past conduct. When combined with the 
trial court's inappropriate actions in treating the Thornocks equally with Father without first 
determining that Father's parental presumption had been rebutted, and in weighing the Thornocks' 
current status against Father's past conduct, the trial court's decision is manifestly unjust. 
Father does not dispute that his past actions are relevant to a determination of whether or 
not his parental presumption should be rebutted. Conditions and events from the past are 
important in understanding the circumstances existing at the time of trial. However, past mistakes 
that have been corrected and overcome should not be used to cause a permanent breach in a family. 
Courts should not use facts existing at some arbitrarily determined "particular point in 
time" as controlling a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent. Rather, the "particular 
point in time" should refer specifically to the time of custody determination and include, when 
necessary, a consideration of past events and conduct. However, it would be inequitable and 
unjust to base an analysis of the parental presumption unevenly on the past conduct of one party 
and the current circumstances of another party, as the trial court did here. Similarly, placing excess 
emphasis on a party's past actions while disregarding their current status and recent efforts to 
establish a stable life would serve only to discourage parents from working to develop qualities 
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which would improve their abilities to care for their children and provide them with a sense of 
security. 
E. The parental presumption cannot properly be rebutted on the basis of Father not 
being continuously present in his child's life, when such absence was due to 
circumstances beyond Father's control. 
The facts of this case show that there was a time in Kory's life when Father and Mother 
voluntarily relinquished custody of Kory to the Thornocks. This is important, but even more 
important is the basis for that action. The facts demonstrate that Father was employed by the U.S. 
Navy and was subject to deployment wherever the Navy saw fit to send him. Father asserted that 
he repeatedly sought a hardship discharge in order to care for Kory. Others have asserted that 
Father could have obtained such a discharge, but chose instead to remain with a girlfriend. R. at 
368, p. 52, lines 2-25; p. 53, lines 1-19. Mr. Jacobson did not ascertain the truth of this matter, 
even though Father provided him with the names of individuals to contact for verification of 
Father's claims that he sought the hardship discharge and the reasons for the Navy's denial of 
Father's requests. R. at 368, p. 41, lines 1-11. 
When Father was stationed in the United States, he attempted to visit Kory when he had 
leave from his duties. However, the Thornocks obstructed and denied Father's attempts to visit 
with his young son. Evaluation at 4, 9-11; R. at 368, p. 41, lines 12-24. As a result, the Thornocks 
prevented Kory from developing a stronger bond with Father. In Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals determined that "testimony given at trial supports 
the court's findings that a strong bond could develop between [father] and [child], and in fact, 
suggests that some bonding already exists." Id. at 893. Additionally, the appellate court 
acknowledged that the evidence regarding the father's attempts to visit with his son suggested "that 
the [custodial grandparents] are at least partly to blame for the sporadic relationship [father] has 
had with [son] and his alleged lack of cooperation with them regarding visitation." Id. at 894. The 
facts in Duncan showed that the maternal grandparents had obstructed and hindered visitation and 
bonding between the minor child and his natural father, and the father prevailed in regaining 
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custody from his child's maternal grandparents. This is precisely the case at bar, and the results 
should be the same in both actions. 
At trial here, the Court determined that the question of whether Father tried as hard as he 
could have for the hardship discharge or whether Father had a relationship with another woman or 
women during his time in the military, when coupled with all of the information that available to 
the Court, "are not significant factors to me in determining what I believe should be done with 
respect to the issue concerning Cory [sic]." R. at 368, p. 65, lines 22-25; p. 66, lines 1-10. Though 
these questions were not of significance to the trial court, they should have been. The answers 
would have helped the trial court determine the extent of Father's efforts to have a relationship 
with Kory and the strength of his desire to do so. By failing to assess the underlying reasons for 
the circumstances existing at trial, the Court failed to perform an acceptable Hutchison evaluation. 
The issue of whether the parental presumption can properly be rebutted on the basis of a 
parent not being continuously involved in his child's life, when such absence is due to 
circumstances beyond the parent's control, has not been previously addressed by Utah courts, other 
than tangentially in Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). However, it is not 
just or equitable to deprive a parent of his legal right to custody of his child on these grounds. The 
Thornocks have failed to demonstrate that any diminishment in the bond between Father and Kory 
was due to lack of parental love or concern on Father's part. Mr. Jacobson has found that Father 
"has a strong bond with his son and Kory recognizes Travis as his father." Addendum at 1. 
Furthermore, Mr. Jacobson believes that, "[g]iven the opportunity to bond more fully with his 
father, [Kory] would most likely develop a closer bond and a more normal father/son relationship." 
Evaluation at 7. 
To the extent that any portion of the trial court's finding that Father and Kory do not share 
a strong attachment to one another was based upon Father's absence from Kory's life, it was 
inappropriate for such a finding to be made without considering the reasons for such absence and 
Father's efforts to remedy the situation. If the trial court determined that the reasons underlying 
Father's absence were irrelevant to the current strength of the father/child bond, then such a 
determination renders useless any efforts a parent may make to establish a relationship with his 
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child, unless those efforts were successful4 Furthermore, grandparents should not be allowed to 
profit from their bad conduct in preventing or hindering an ongoing relationship and bond between 
a parent and child. 
Under the circumstances of this case, it was improper for the trial court to find that Father's 
parental presumption had been rebutted on the basis of Father's absence from Kory's life. 
F. Father's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of his 
child was violated by the trial court's award of custody to the child's grandparents 
without first showing a legitimate, let alone a compelling, government interest. 
In the case of Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000), the United States Supreme Court 
reviewed a statute from the State of Washington which provided that any person may petition the 
courts for visitation at any time, and that the courts may order visitation rights for any person when 
visitation may serve the best interest of the child. The Supreme Court first determined that M[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has a substantive component that 'provides 
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests . . . including parents' fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody 
and control of their children." Id. at 2056 (citations omitted). 
In Troxel paternal grandparents petitioned for visitation with children born out of wedlock. 
The children's mother did not oppose visitation altogether, but did want to limit visitation. The 
Washington Supreme Court, determining that the statute was an unconstitutional infringement on 
the fundamental right of parents to rear their children, affirmed the decision by the Washington 
4
 It is interesting to note the observation made by the Utah Court of Appeals in State in re 
J.M., 940 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), when distinguishing the case of Duncan v. Howard, 
918 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), from the facts before it. Unlike Duncan, the trial court in 
J.M. had found all three Hutchison characteristics had been rebutted. With respect to the finding 
in Duncan that the bond between father and son was not a strong bond, the J.M. court noted that 
"the father in Duncan had been prevented from establishing a stronger bond due almost entirely 
to circumstances outside his control", while the father in J.M. had no such obstructions. JJVL, 
940P.2dat531,n.4. 
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Court of Appeals that the non-parents could not obtain visitation tinder the Washington statute. Id. 
at 2058. 
Troxel involved issues of visitation by non-parents, whereas this case involves a 
determination of custody between a parent and a non-parent. However, the principles used by the 
Supreme Court in its analysis in Troxel are even more compelling when the question involves the 
more fundamental right of a parent to have custody of his child. In discussing the constitutional 
liberty interest of parents in the care, custody and control of their children, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that ,f[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state 
can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 2060 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
The Supreme Court cites a number of additional cases in which it has reaffirmed the constitutional 
protection provided to parents under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children. Id. at 2060 (citing, inter 
alia, Ouilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions 
that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Santoskv v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the 
care, custody, and management of their child"); Washington v. Glucksberg. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
(stating that, "[i]n a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes 
the righ[t] . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one's children")). 
In a concurring opinion to the decision of Troxel Justice Thomas notes that none of the 
opinions of the plurality identify the appropriate standard of review applicable to the analysis of a 
parent's fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children. He then states, "I would apply 
strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State of Washington lacks even a 
legitimate governmental interest - to say nothing of a compelling one - in second-guessing a fit 
parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties." Id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring). In 
the case now at bar, the trial court's findings failed to show any basis for any governmental interest 
in depriving Father of his parental presumption. Had Kory been neglected or in any way 
mistreated, the State would, of course, have had a compelling interest, but this was not the case. 
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One of the Supreme Court's concerns with the Washington statute in question was that the 
statutory language allowed any person to file a visitation petition with the courts, and once the 
petition was before the judge there is no requirement that the court accord any deference 
whatsoever to the parent's decision that visitation would not be in the best interest of the child. Id. 
at 2061. In fact, the statute makes "no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any 
presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever." Id. If the judge disagreed with the parent's 
determination of the child's best interests, the judge's opinion would prevail. "Thus, in practical 
effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial 
parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation 
petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests." Id. 
The Supreme Court went on to discuss the parental presumption that fit parents act in the 
best interests of their children. "[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., 
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the 
rearing of that parent's children." Id. The problem identified by the Supreme Court was not that 
the Washington courts intervened in a mother's decisions regarding visitation, "but that when it did 
so, it gave no special weight at all to [the mother's] determination of her daughters' best interests." 
Id. at 2062. The Supreme Court was extremely concerned that the Washington Superior Court 
actually applied the opposite presumption that the grandparents' request for visitation should be 
granted unless the children would be adversely affected thereby. "In effect, the judge placed on 
Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best 
interest of her daughters." Id. This is exactly what the Court below did in the trial of the present 
action. By ignoring the custody evaluation's findings that Father did meet the Hutchison criteria at 
the time of trial and by failing to consider that Father's actions in the past had been made with his 
son's best interests in mind, Judge Stott improperly placed on Father the burden of proving that his 
parental presumption should not be rebutted. 
In Troxel, the Supreme Court noted that the Washington Superior Court had given no 
weight to the mother's willingness to allow visitation on a limited basis, and acknowledged that in 
many states visitation cannot be court-ordered unless a parent has denied, or unreasonably denied, 
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visitation to the third party involved. Id. at 2063. In the present case, the trial court gave no 
weight to Father's willingness to facilitate visitation with the Thornocks or to make a gradual 
change of custody in order to minimize any negative impact on Kory. Rather, the Court 
determined, without the support of any psychological assessments or conclusions, that it would be 
better for Kory's mental and emotional needs if custody were to remain with the Thornocks. 
As stated in Troxel, "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the 
fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 
'better' decision could be made." Troxel 120 S.Ct. at 2064. It is a violation of Father's 
constitutional rights to rebut Father's parental presumption solely on Judge Stott's belief that the 
Thornocks are the better custodians of the minor child. The Hutchison case sets forth the 
requirements to be satisfied by a non-parent seeking to rebut the parental presumption, and 
specifies that the best interests of the child are not to be considered until the parental presumption 
has been successfully rebutted. The trial court's award of custody to the Thornocks was made by 
improperly applying the best interests analysis in order to "rebut" Father's parental presumption. 
Such a procedure is contrary to the constitutional protection to which Father is entitled under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a result Father has been deprived of his 
constitutional right to the care, custody and control of his child. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing arguments, the parental presumption in favor of 
Kory's custody being with Father has not been rebutted. In some cases this Court has remanded 
for new findings when the findings have been found to be insufficient rather than addressing other 
issues, such as insufficiency of the evidence. To remand in this case would improperly reward the 
Thornocks, whose burden it was to rebut Father's parental presumption but who presented no 
evidence at trial and whose delaying tactics have already been noted. R. at 321-22; R. at 65, Iflj 9-
10; R. at 78-79. Rather than remand, and continue the unwarranted separation of Kory and Father 
for another unspecified period of time, Father requests that this Court address his remaining 
arguments, determine that the parental presumption was not rebutted, reverse the Final Order of the 
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trial court, and award custody of Kory to Father with reasonable visitation to Thornocks pursuant 
to U.C.A. §30-3-35. ) 
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CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION 
Date: December 28,1998 Re: Case # 964401886 
Mother: Elizabeth Anne Davis 545 North Homestead Dr. #5, Heber, Utah 
Father: Travis B. Davis 109 North 1600 West, Provo, Utah 
Grandparents: George and Sandra Thornock, 176 East Heather Road, Provo, Utah 
Child: Kory Lynn Davis: DOB 9-24-92, resides with his grandparents 
L Request and Procedures 
Pursuant to a stipulated agreement entered into by the parties and ordered by the 
Honorable Gary D Stott, Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court, this custody evaluation has been 
completed on the litigants by the undersigned Certified Social Worker At issue is the custody of 
six year old Kory Lynn Davis Kory has been in the custody of his maternal grandparents, Mr and 
Mrs George Thornock for the past five years 
The procedures followed by this evaluator are consistent with those generally accepted as 
critical elements to be addressed in evaluating families An attempt has been made to identify the 
custodial arrangement that will provide the greatest opportunity for Kory to succeed in the 
socialization process and become a productive member of society Among other factors, the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the father and the grandparents have been evaluated with 
respect to their parenting style, their approach to discipline, their personal values, as well as moral 
and ethical considerations Also considered and evaluated was their level of understanding of child 
development, their expectations of their children, and the extent that support is available from 
family and community 
The Rules of Judicial Administration. Rule 4-903 has been used as a paradigm for 
addressing critical issues The considerations as outlined by Jeff Atkinson in his article entitled 
Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, The Family Law 
Quarterly. Volume XVIII, Number I, Spring 1984, has also been used as a guideline 
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The evaluation was initiated on the 1st day of October 1998 and required minimum of thirty 
hours of professional time in interviewing, reviewing written materials, and writing the report Mr 
Davis 2nd Mr and Mrs. Thornock were interviewed in their respective homes on several 
occasions, with approximately equal time spent with each party The child, Kory, was interviewed 
and observed in the home of his father and the home of his grandparents The natural mother, 
Elizabeth Anne Davis, does not actively seek custody for herself It is her desire the Kory 
continue in the care and custody of the grandparents, Mr and Mrs Thornock In the event the 
grandparents are not awarded custody, Elizabeth believes she should be next in line to receive 
custody 
As part of the evaluation process, five people were interviewed for additional information 
and insight Each party was asked to supply names of persons who might be familiar with their 
personality and parenting skills In the course of the evaluation the following people were 
interviewed in person or by telephone 
Maureen Davis, Travis's stepmother 
Patricia Davis, Travis's mother 
Danielle Davis, Travis's wife 
Bob Davis, Travis's father 
Elizabeth Anne Davis, Kory's mother 
II. Background Information 
Each parent was invited to describe his or her current concerns about the present 
situation with Kory. Information was gathered from individual interviews with the parents, 
grandparents, and from collateral contacts. 
A. Father's Point of View 
When asked to state in writing his reasons for wanting custody, Travis offered the 
following 
"There are many reasons I want custody of my son. The most apparent 
one's are he is my child and I am his father, his only father, and I love him 
with all my heart. I deserve the opportunity to raise him. To teach and guide 
and protect. My responsibility as his father goes much farther than just 
financially supporting him. It means that I share in his joys and sadness, his 
love and anger, and in his ambitions. 
The one thing I can *t understand throughout this custody trial is "when did 
I lose my parental rights? ". I have never abused nor neglected my child in 
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anyway. So how can grandparents get temporary custody of a child over a 
parent? I love Kory and it hurt's me that he isn 't living with me and his 
stepmother, step sister, and half sister. So why do we want custody? We love 
himV 
Travis is very frustrated about the loss of custody and what he views as Mr. and Mrs. 
Thornock constytly^d^nyingjiim his rightfijj visitations He believes the only reason he lost 
custody of Kory was because he was in the military and could not assume his rightful duty as 
Kory's father. He insists he has never done anything to neglec^OT abusejCory and should 
therefore not be denied his right to have custody. 
Travis and Elizabeth began dating when they were teenagers. Travis joined the Navy 
when he was eighteen years old and they continued to correspond with each other. Elizabeth 
was having a difficult time living with her parents and Travis reports that they asked him to 
come home and marry Elizabeth. Elizabeth became pregnant while Travis was home on leave 
and during his next leave from the Navy they were married. They moved to California for three 
months where they experienced some serious marital difficulties. Travis sent Elizabeth back to 
Utah to live with her parents. She was living with her parents when Kory was born. 
Travis insists Elizabeth did not care for Kory because that role was completely taken 
over by her mother, Mrs. Thornock. Elizabeth and her parents had a very strained relationship 
and Mrs. Thornock would not let Elizabeth assume her role as mother. 
Travis jetumed from duty in Spain when Kory was about three months old. He moved 
ElizabetLanolKqryjo California. Their relationship deteriorated and became "really bad." 
Travis reports that the role of primary caretaker fell to him because ofEliz^thlsiiiimatui^ 
and refusal to provide proper care. The couple attempted marital counseling but Elizabeth 
would not see the counselor without Travis so the therapy terminated. Travis reports that the 
counselor identified Elizabeth's problem as a "father/daughter problem." The relationship 
continued to deteriorate and Travis suspected Elizabeth was having affairs with other men. 
Travis used this time in his life to "get close to Kory" because he was the primary caretaker 
while Elizabeth was away from the home. Kory was about ten months old at this time^ 
Travis lefHbrjJ^ir of rtity in fillam He was concerned about Elizabeth's ability to 
care for Kory but felt like she might be forced to assume her role as motheuvhen Travis left the 
home. He called home soon after his arrival in Guam to check on his family. The telephone was 
answered by a man at 4:00 a.m. Elizabeth came to the telephone and advised Travis that she 
wanted a divorce. Three months after arriving in Guam, Travis reports that Elizabeth had her 
telephone disconnected and he lost contact with her. 
The situation with Elizabeth and her son becamejvery neglectfol and the State of 
California was about to ta£e"custody of Kory. The grandparents were contacted, Mr. and Mrs. 
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Thoraock, and they went to California to retrieve Kory while Elizabeth remained in California. 
Travis states that he was never contacted byThe State~of California or the Navy regarding the 
neglect of his son. 
When Travis arrived in the United States on temporary leave from his assignment in 
Guam, he was met at the airport by officers who served him withjiiyprce papers He obtained a 
military delay of the divorce proceeding until he could return to the U.S to address the matter. 
He did manage to have jurisdiction of the custody issue and the divorce transferred to Utah. 
Temporary custody of Kory was awarded to Mr. and Mrs. Thornocjc. Travis attempted to 
reconcile with Elizabeth and they decided to get back together as husband and wife. Mr. and 
Mrs. Thoraock refused to allow them to have custody of Kory and onlered them to leave the 
Thoraock home. Travis reports that Elizabeth's parents talked her out of reconciling and Travis 
returned to California and a tour of duty in Sicily. He had thirty days ofleave each ye?r and all 
of his attempts JojogitjaatliKory during these times werejenied by Mr. and Mrs. Thoraock. 
He was allowed only limited visitations only after the Court ordered the Mr. and Mrs. 
Thoraock to allow visitations. 
Travis- completed additional tours of duty in Guam and left the-military determined to-
resolve his divorce and the custody issue. j\t_this time Kory was about five years old. He 
continued toencounter resistance and refusal to his requests for visitation. He was also 
concerned about Kory referring to Mr. and Mrs. Thoraock as ccMom and Dad'' and referring to 
him, Travis, as 'Travis. "He has had more success in gaining visitation recently and he reports 
that his time spent with Kory is very positive and meaningful. 
Travis's position is that he was denied custody because he was in the military not 
because he was a bad Dad. He seeks to have custody of Kory awarded to him. 
B. Mr. and Mrs, Thoraock's Point of View 
When asked to state in writing their reasons for wanting custody of Kory, Mr. and Mrs. 
Thornock responded as following: 
"Besides the fact that Kory hgsJixzdJiere, on an everydgyjmsjs for the last 
5 years, he feels happy here, same and secure, and that this is his home. " 
"We love-Kory as if he is our own and would do anything for him. I gave.up 
myjob to stay at homeand be a mom to him because I didn 'tfeel he needed 
to be in daycare all the time. Kory is a major part of our lives. Both 
Elizabeth and Travis sat in our home 2 years ago and asked us to continue^ 
to raise Kory because they felt that this is where he belonged and was happy 
here." 
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"We do believe that it would be best for Kory to stay in our custody because 
of the emotional bonding and the love we fee I for each other. " 
Mr. and Mrs. Thornock believe Kory should remain in their custody. They describe two 
very immature and young parents who were notifor marriage and certainly not ready to be 
parents. Kory came to their home when he was about one year old. The State of California 
contacted them to take physical custody of Kory to avoid a foster home placement due to 
severe and chronic neglect^on the partof Elizabeth. He arrived in their home in November of 
1993 and has continued to reside with them since, that time. Travis and Elizabeth did not appear 
to have the level of maturity required manage their own lives and care for Kory. They report 
that Travis had a girlfriend in Guamand was torn between the girlfriend and returning to 
Elizabeth. Travis did not make any attempt to contact Kory'or offer financial'suppbrt untjThe 
was ordered to dojo. They have not denied him visitation except when Kory has been sick. 
Travis has failed to give them proper notice prior to wanting a visit and sometimes calls them to 
demand a visit with only twenty minutes notice. Visitation has been difficult but they have 
attempted to make every effort to comply with the Court's order. 
When Travis and Elizabeth were finally divorced in 1997,*they specifically asked Mr.-
and Mrs. Thornock, prior to the divorce, to continue to raise Kory as their.Q£viLSQn, This-
conversatiojoj^as-r^c^d^jand r[^^j^\xr^p3iQTit denies it. Travis states that his statement 
was a ploy suggested by his attorney to stop Mr. and Mrs. Thornock from interfering in his 
relationship with Elizabeth. Mrs. Thornock quit her job to become a full time mother for Kory. 
They are committed to Kory as their son and they are prepared to offer him every opportunity 
to realize his full potential. They believe he should have a relationship w*th h™ father W HIQ 
home should be with them. 
Mr. and Mrs. Thornock seek to retain full custody of Kory. 
C. Elizabeth Davis's Point of View 
When asked to state in writing her position with regard to custody of her son, Elizabeth 
offered the following: 
"JJeel that Kory should either live with me, his mother, or at my parents hom&, 
where he has resided since November 7, 1993. At the time I was living in 
California and my father had come down on business. I asked him to take Kory 
home with him so that I could pack up our apartment that we were living in. On 
the 1st of November, I had not received my regular allotment from Travis, for 
while he was in Guam, that was to be used to pay the rent At that time I asked 
my parents to look after Kory until I returned to Utah. I returned to Utah on 
December 10, 1993.1 had left some things in storage in California that I would 
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need to return for. On December 29, 1993,1 returned to California to collect 
the things that I had in storage and to also return the U-Haul trailer that my 
father had rented for me. I left for the return trip to Utah on January 4, 1994,1 
hadn 't wanted to travel over the busy holiday weekend I returned to Utah on 
January 5, 1994." 
"Sometime in February of 1994,1 filed divorce papers. I had not received any 
support from Travis for 4 months. The divorce proceedings were dismissed 
because thadlnot resided in the state for 3 months prior to filing for a divorce 
On March 21, 1994, a friend of mine offered me a job in Heber, so that 1 could 
get started on making a life for myself and my son. I moved to Heber, after 
asking my parents if it was O.K. for them to take care of Kory while 1 worked 
up in HeSer. They said that would be fine. I continued to live in Heber until 
September of that same year. My parents took care of Kory the entire time. 1 
met Gary in February of 1995 and we have been together since that time. I am 
soon to be the stepmother of 3 very wonderful boys, that at this time live with 
their mothers. They come andstay'with us for weekends when they are able." 
ulfKory was to be taken from my parents home, at which he has resided for 5 
years, I would be more than able to care for him in the manner that he deserves 
and needs. He would attend Midway Elementary which is approximately 1 mile 
from my home." 
Elizabeth realizes she has made some serious mistakes in her past She is very 
comfortable having Kory live with her parents where she can have limited contact with him She 
visits her parent's home about once a month and has a good relationship with Kory 
Elizabeth seeks to have custody of Kory remain with her parents. 
PI. Parenting Issues as Defined by Rule 4-903 — Uniform Custody Evaluations 
The following comments are organized as responses to the issues defined by Rule 4-
903. They represent the evaluator's synthesis, observations, and conclusions regarding this 
matter and are based on the interviews with the parents, contacts with collateral sources, and 
the evaluator's impressions and professional experience. 
A. The Relative Strength of the Children's Bond with One or Both of the Prospective 
Custodians 
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caretakers in his Hfbfor_as long as4te>ganj^ iQernber. He has not had the opportunity to develop 
a boncf with his father because he has, for the most part, been absent from his life Hejippears * 
f o have CTeateranxietyjssues when separatingjrom his grandparents than ^jign^egaigting^om 
his ^ KeTpI^stegm^erTThis is because he has never, for whatever reasons, had the 
opportunity to develop a close relationship with Travis. During the limited times he has been 
with his father he has enjoyed being in his presence and looks to him for support and comfort. 
Given the opportunity to bond more fully with his father he would most likely develop a closer 
bond and a more normal father/son relationship. 
Conclusion: Kory has a stronger emotional bond with his grandparent than he does 
with his natural father This factor appears to favor Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. 
B. The child's Preferences 
Kory was interviewed and evaluated in his father's home and the home of his 
grandparents. He is a quiet boy who is reluctantjaiiisck^ M* f^ing,g_™th regard to his 
future. He is well aware of the Court process and the potential impact it could have on his life. 
He attends Kindergarten at Nothridge Elementary school and reports his favorite class to be 
recess. He enjoys school and appears to have established a circle of friends there. He has 
mastered the critical developmental tasks for his age and appears to be a happy and well 
adjusted six year old boy. His interaction with this evaluator was normal and spontaneous after 
a period of get-acquainted talk. He did not appear to be overly anxious or fearful about 
discussing his life in general. When conversation centered around his feelings toward his father, 
mother, and grandparents, he became more reluctant to disclose his feelings. His responses to 
the same questions presented to him while in his father's home and the home of his 
grandparents were consistently the same. 
Kory's affect was observed to be normal other than his early reluctance to discuss his 
feeling about his parents. His interaction with this evaluator was warm and responsive. His 
attention span, listening skills, and comprehension were appropriate for his age group. He also 
appeared to enter into free play with his step-siblings by reaching out positively to them. There 
were no observable indications of psychological or behavioral disorders. 
Kory was asked to draw a picture of his family while in his father's home and while in 
his grandparent's home. In his father's home he drew a picture of his father (Travis), 
stepmother (Danielle), and his sisters, Nicole and Jesse, and himself. He described his family as 
"having fun at Trafalga." In the home of his grandparents his picture included his Dad (Mr. 
Thornock), his mother (Elizabeth), Bob (his twenty-one-year old brother), and himself. He said 
they were a "happy family" and then added that he really liked to visit Lisa (he refers to his birth 
mother, Elizabeth, as Lisa) and he ^ noUik^tovisiUiis father, Travis. He also stated that he 
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did not like Danielle because she yelled at him. 
Kory was presented with a situation where he was alone on an island and asked to 
choose the one person he would like to have come and'live with him on the island. His first 
choice was his mother, Lisa. He then chose his dad (Mr. Thornock), and finally his dog, Tisha. 
He chose his mother as the first person he would choose to live with him when presented with 
this scenanoliTboth homes. 
When Kory was asked if he enjoyed visiting with his father he responded in the 
affirmative. He especially enjoys the time they spend at the Trafalga amusement park. When 
asked who his very favorite person was he responded, clisa — my mom, but I don't see her too 
often." 
When Kory was asked how he would advise a small boy who had to choose between 
living with his father or his grandparents, he said the boy^wouldbe^happier with his 
Kory was noted to interact comfortably with his father, stepmother, and stepsister. He 
displayed a high level of comfort while interacting with Travis and Danielle and did not appear 
to be overly anxious or concerned with seeking attention from either of them. He was likewise 
very comfortable in the presence of his grandparents. He was anxious to please his grandmother 
and sought her approval of his actions at all times. She in turn, provided him with positive 
reinforcement when he responded to her requests. 
Conclusion: Kory is very aware of the potential for a major change in his life as a 
result of "the Court. " He is a sensitive boy and it is obvious that he values the time he spends 
with his father and his grandparents. This evaluator }s interviews and observations with Kory 
suggest that he is attached and bonded to his grandparents more so than to his father and 
stepmother. This is to be expected inasmuch as he has been with his grandparents for the past 
five years and has interacted with them as their child. He was noted to display high levels of 
comfort interacting with both his father and his grandparents. He actively sought physical 
contact with both families and appeared to be interested in engaging them in play as well as 
conversation. His preference for a home, both expressed and implied, pvors his ^rcmd^are^s. 
At the same time he would like to have a relationship with his father. 
This factor appears to favor Mr. and Mrs. Thornock as custodial parents for Kory. 
C. The Benefit of Keeping Siblings Together 
Maintaining the integrity of sibling groups assists children to maintain a stable identity 
and manage the stress in their lives. Kory enjoys the company of his stepsister but he has not 
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fully bonded to them as siblings. He is very close to Bob, his twenty-one year old "brother." 
Kory does not have any birth siblings at this time. 
Conclusion: This appears to be a non-factor at this time although Kory should be 
encouraged to develop a sibling relationship with his stepsister. 
D. General Interest in Continuing Previously Determined Custody Arrangements Where 
the Child is Happy and Well-Adjusted. 
Kory appears to be well-taken care of and does not demonstrate any psychological 
distress or maladjustment in his present custodial home with Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. Mrs. 
Thornock states that he becomes distressed and clingy prior to visits with his father but is 
otherwise a very healthy and well-adjusted boy. 
Conclusion: There is no evidence to support discontinuation of the current custody 
arrangement based on psychological distress or emotional maladjustment of Kory. This factor 
favors continuation of Kory in his present custodial home with Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. 
E. Factors Relating to the Prospective Custodians' Character or Status or Their 
Capacity or Willingness to Function as Parents, Including: 
i- Moral Character and emotional Stability 
Travis and Elizabeth lacked the quality of moral character and emotional maturity that is 
usually associated with mature, relatively healthy functioning adults. They entered into their 
marriage ill-prepared for the challenges of marriage and parenting. Neither of them appears to 
have been emotionally mature at the time of their marriage. To their credit, they have benefited 
from the experience of a failed marriage and appear to have resolved many of their immature 
behaviors. They appear to be more honest and trustworthy now than at any other time in their 
development. The Thomocks, as well as Travis's father and stepmother, insist that Travis 
continues to be irresponsible and immature. Hjsjgthgr and stepmothgrgre especjalj)Lvocal in-
their negatiyejopinion oflravis. They are very supportive of the Thomocks as custodial parents 
because Travis is, according to his father, a liar and a thief who abandoned his son in favor of a 
girlfriend in Spain. Mr Bob Davis, Travis's father, insists he will fight to keep his grandson 
with Mr. and Mrs. Thornock, 
Travis's mother, Mrs. Patricia Davis, speaks very highly of her son. She believes the 
Thomocks have conspired to deny Travis visitation by conveniently being on vacation when 
Travis was home on leave from the Navy or by insisting Kory was "sick" or it was 
"inconvenient" for them. She insists Travis has tried consistently to gain access to Kory but he 
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has been continuously denied visitation by Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. Mrs. Davis acknowledges 
that the Thornocks have provided excellent care for Kory and that he is loved in their home. 
She believes the Thornocks need to learn to share Kory with his father and paternal 
grandmother. 
Travis admits that he has made a lot of mistakes in his life. He has exercised poor 
judgement in the past but now feels like his life is stabilizing and he has matured considerably. 
His biggest asset at this time is Danielle, his wife, who has had a very positive effect on Travis's 
life. They have a stable and secure marriage with two beautifiil daughters and they would dearly 
love to have Kory in their home. 
George and Sandy Thornock are mature and honest people of integrity. Their moral 
character is above reproach. 
Conclusion: Both Travis and Danielle and Mr. and Mrs. Thornock are fit parents at this 
time. Travis has made a concerted effort to develop a good home and a secure marriage. Each 
family has important qualities relevant to their ability to function as parents. They have 
sufficient'moral character and emotional stability to function as parents for Kory. This factor 
appears to favor Mr. and Mrs. Thornock because of the long term stability of their 
relationship and their long-term strong moral and ethical character. 
2- Duration and Depth of Desire for Custody 
Kory has been in the primary care and custody of his grandparents, George and Sandy 
Thornock for almost his entire life. They view him as their son and they have a strong desire to 
continue his care in their home. 
Travis has not had physical custody of Kory since the boy was about one year old. His 
absence from Kory's life may have been beyond his control but this is irrelevant to Kory's need 
for continuity of care and a stable family atmosphere in which to grow and master the 
developmental tasks of childhood. His desire for custody of Kory at this time is very sincere and 
noble but the fact remains that he has, for whatever reason, been absent for most of Kory's life. 
At one point in Travis's life he specifically requested that Mr. and Mrs. Thornock raise Kory in 
their home as their son. Both Travis and the Thornocks have made significant personal and 
financial sacrifices in order to pursue custody. 
Conclusion: AlthouglyheJQion^ are 
neaiLequaljntiieir d^es^toJbecemgThexustodial j)arejits_aLthis time. This factor favors the 
ThomockTbTviSue^ofAe fact that they have the custodial parents for the past five years. 
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5- Ability to Provide Personal Rather than Surrogate Care. 
As this report is written, Danielle Davis is the sole breadwinner in the Davis home. 
Travis has been recently laid off from his job at Geneva Steel. He fully expects to be hired as a 
guard at the Utah State Prison in the near future. When he becomes employed full time at the 
prison, it will allow Danielle to become more of a full time mother. They would not need 
substitute care for the children at that time. 
Mrs. Thornock is a full time home maker and is always available for Kory. Kory would 
never need day care in the Thornock home. 
Conclusion: This is not a significant factor inasmuch neither family would require the use of 
day care for 
4- Significant Impairment of Ability to Function as a Parent Through Drug Abuse, 
Excessive Drinking, or Other Causes 
Both parties reported that they do not use alcohol, tobacco, or other drugs at this time. 
Travis has had some problems in this area but they are in his past and he now insists he does not 
use drugs. He is well aware that the use of drugs at this time would preclude him from 
employment at the prison. 
Conclusion: This appears to be a non-factor in this evaluation. 
5- Reasons for Having Relinquished Custody in the Past 
Travis insists he was in not position to care for Kory at the time of the divorce because 
he was in the Navy. He states that he tried repeatedly to obtain a hardship release but was 
denied. Elizabeth appears to have never asserted her right to care for Kory and willingly 
abdicated this role to her parents. Both parents entered into a voluntary agreement with the 
Thornocks to have them continue as the custodial parents for Kory. The Thornocks willingly 
accepted this responsibility and have devoted their time and resources to Kory's best interest. 
Travis has been assessed a support obligation of $234.00 per month. He states that he is 
current on this obligation but the Thornocks dispute this statement. 
Conclusion: This factor clearly favors the Thornocks. 
6- Religious Compatibility with the Children 
Both parties are members of the LDS Church. Both believe that religious training is 
important in the life of a child. Mrs. Thornock is more active in her church activities than is Mr. 
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Thornock. She attends church with Kory and encourages his involvement in such activities. 
Travis and Danielle attend church and encourage their daughters to participate. 
Conclusion: Religious preference or compatibility is not an issue in this. 
7- Kinship, Including in Extraordinary Circumstances Stepparent Status 
The "stepparent" in this matter is Danielle. She is a maternal person who totally enjoys 
caring for her daughters and meeting the needs of her family. She is anxious to have Kory in 
their home and appears to have a close relationship with him. Some of the extended family 
members have reported that she is resentful and punitive toward Kory but this evaluator did not 
observe anything that would support this claim. Danielle appears to be a very dedicated mother. 
Other kinship factors include the grandparents other than the Thornocks. Travis's 
mother, Mrs. Patricia Davis, is a single women. She wanted to care for Kory in his father's 
absence but could not do so because of her employment. She supports Travis and insists she 
too has been denied access to Koiy by the Thornocks. She would like to be able to have a 
relationship with her grandson. 
The paternal grandfather and step-grandmother support the Thornocks and believe Kory 
should remain in their care and custody as he has for the past five years. They have had limited 
access to Kory and would like to spend more time with him. 
Conclusion: Visitation and the promotion of a loving relationship with both paternal 
grandparents as well as the Thornocks is in the best interest of Kory. However, the 
grandparents must be aware of the negative impact of denigrating the parents or the other 
grandparents on Kory's identity and self-esteem. 
8- Financial Condition 
Travis and Danielle are a young couple with small children who are struggling 
financially. Travis has recently lost his job the Geneva Steel Company and they are now living 
on Danielle's income alone. Danielle makes a minimum wage while working at Roberts Craft in 
Provo. The future appears promising inasmuch as Travis has completed his testing and security 
requirements for employment as a security guard at the Utah State Prison. He fully expects to 
secure employment at the prison within the next few weeks. His monthly income prior to being 
terminated at Geneva Steel was about $2,800. Major liabilities included a mortgage payment of 
$850.00, a vehicle payment and child support. 
George Thornock is employed in retail sales at the RC. Wiley store. He has a secure job 
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with excellent benefits and a yearly salary of about $70,000.00. They have liabilities of about 
$1200.00 per month including a mortgage payment of $735.00. They manage their resources in 
a frugal manner and live comfortably on their income. Kory is included on their health and life 
insurance policies. 
Conclusion: This would appear to favor Mr. and Mrs. Thomock by virtue of their more stable 
employment history and greater income. Travis and Danielle are struggling financially but 
their first spending priority is their children. No matter what their monthly income, the 
physical needs of their children receives top priority. 
Kory would have more opportunities to realize his greatest potential in the Thornock 
home but he would not be neglected if he were placed in his father's home. Both parties have 
the financial resources to meet the physical needs of their children. Kory would not be a 
financial burden to either family. This factor is considered to equal even though the Thornocks 
have the greater financial resources. 
9- Evidence of Abuse of the Subject Child, Another Child, or Spouse 
This is a non-factor in that neither party accuses the other of child abuse. Kory may 
have been neglected during the first year of his life but the parties agree that he is receiving 
excellent care at this time. There is no indication that either couple has engaged in behavior that 
would constitute child abuse or domestic violence. 
F. Other Factors, Summary and Conclusions 
Immaturity appears to have been a major factor in the demise of this relationship and 
Kory's subsequent placement with his maternal grandparents. Travis and Elizabeth were not 
prepared for the challenges of managing a marital relationship and meeting the emotional and 
physical needs of a child. Their relationship was further complicated and stressed by Travis's 
absence from the home during his military duty. Elizabeth neglected Kory during his early life 
and he would most likely have been placed in foster care if extended family members had not 
been available to provide for him. There is no indication that either party made a serious 
attempt to resolve their marital differences through counseling. 
Travis asserts that he was unable to assume his parental responsibility because of his 
military assignments that took him out of the country. There is some indication that he 
volunteered for overseas duty to continue a relationship with a girlfriend. For whatever reason 
he was absent from Kory's early formative years and Kory has progressed very well without a 
significant contribution by either his father or mother. The maternal grandparents have a very 
close relationship with Kory and they are the parental figures in his life. There is concern that 
the Thornocks have made a conscious effort to shield Kory from contact with his father in the 
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hope that he would simply give up his efforts to regain custody or have a father and son 
relationship. There is also concern that the paternal grandparents, especially the paternal 
grandmother, have been denied the right to a relationship with Kory. Kory knows his father and 
mother and wishes to have contact with them. His stated preference is to remain in the home of 
his grandparents and have occasional visitation with his parents. 
The acrimony that exists between Travis and the Thornocks has made it very difficult 
for them to work together for Kory's best interest. They continue to make and deny allegations 
against each other. Their perception of their own position becomes reality for them and they 
conduct themselves accordingly. For example; Mr. and Mrs. Thoraock state that Travis has 
made little or no effort to seek visitation. Travis laments that he has made numerous attempts, 
by telephone and in person, to make contact with the Thornocks to gain visitation but they have 
refused to make Kory available. 
While Kory prefers to live with his grandparents, he continues to desire a limited 
relationship with his parents. He should have this right. His mother has abdicated her right to be 
a mother and should not be considered as a custodial parent. Travis truly desires to have 
custody of his son and if custody is not awarded to him he desires to have a close relationship 
with his son. He should have this right. 
V. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are respectfully submitted for the Court's 
consideration: 
1- Physical and legal custody of Kory should remain with his maternal grandparents, Mr. 
and Mrs. George Thoraock. 
Rationale: Travis has been in the care of his grandparents for the past five years. He has never 
known a home other than the one he now resides in. To summarily transfer custody to Travis 
would be a veiy difficult adjustment for Kory. 
2- Standard visitation should be awarded to Kory's father, Travis Davis. 
Rationale: Kory should have the right to have a relationship with his father. Travis should have 
the right to a relationship with his son. 
3- The paternal grandparent should have an equal opportunity to develop a relationship 
with Kory. 
Rationale: Kory should have the right to benefit from the love and support of both his maternal 
and paternal grandparents. 
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4- All parties should be cautioned against arguing or making disparaging remarks about 
each other, especially in the presence of Kory. 
Rationale: Kory has not totally resolved his feelings of loss and grief associated with the loss of 
his birth parents. His adjustment to visitations will be much easier if her both parties will work 
together to refrain from acrimony and thereby mitigate the confusion Kory feels in his life. 
These recommendations are respectfully offered to the court with the sincere hope that they will 
be of benefit in identifying the best custodial placement and visitation arrangement for Kory. 
Lynn M. Jacobson, MSW 
Certified Social Worker 
Addendum 
Davis v. Thornock 
Civil No. 964401886 
Custodial Evaluation Submitted: December 28,1998 
Addendum Submitted: March 17,1998 
The custodial evaluation submitted by the undersigned Certified Social Worker on the 28th day 
of December 1998 recommended that six-year old Kory Davis continue in the legal custody of his 
maternal grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. George Thornock. The report did not adequately address three 
critical factors identified by the Utah Court of Appeals when consideration is given to placing a child 
with a nonparent party. These three factors or characteristics, sometimes referred to as the "Hutchison 
factors," give rise to the issue of parental presumption. The three characteristics are: 1- That no strong 
mutual bond exists; 2- That the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrificeiik^he^ewn 
interest and welfare for the chilcTs; and, 3- That the parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of 
tEejbildjhat is characteristic ofparents generally. This addendum will briefly addressIhese three 
factors with regard to Mr. Travis Davis and his son, Kory. 
"That no strong mutual bond exists* 
Travis and Elizabeth Davis were young and immature when they married after discovering that 
Elizabeth was pregnant. The normal bonding and attachment process between the parents and their 
child was disrupted by Elizabeth's physical and emotional neglect of Kory and by Travis's physical 
absence from Kory's life for the past six years. Travis assets that his absence from his son's life was 
due to his military obligation and was therefore beyond his control. He does not believe he should be 
denied his parental presumption based on circumstances beyond his control. He insists he has been 
denied regular and timely visits with his son by the grandparents and his efforts to establish a bond with 
his son have been thwarted. 
Travis could have obtained a "hardship" discharge from the military if he had requested one. 
When Kory was identified as a neglected and dependent child by the State of California, Tjayis, ps the 
sole available caretaker of his son, could have requested and obtained either a hardship release or 
reassig^ienrordSyto^a navalbase IxTSecqi^ental Umtedjitates. TfcTevaluation process reveals 
that Travlsilad~a paramour relationship(s) while assigned over-seas duty and was content to continue 
his military career while Kory was cared for by Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. It is also noted that Travis 
verbally consented to Kory being raised by Mr. and Mrs. Thornock as if he were their child. Travis 
does not deny making this statement but asserts that his verbal consent for Mr. and Mrs. Thornock to 
raise Kory as their son was nothing more than a ploy to prevent the Thomocks from interfering with his 
attempts to reconcile with Elizabeth. 
Travis now has a stable and secure marriage. He has matured and now realizes how much he 
loves Kory and wants him to be a part of his new family. Travishag a strong bond with hisjson-and 
Koiyjrecognizes TravJsjsJais^attier. Kory's parent/child bonHlswiii the Thomocks who are the only 
people heKas ever know as parents. He enjoys visiting with his father but his "home" is with the 
Thomocks. 
"That the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and 
welfare for the child's" 
Travis does not appear to have been willing to sacrifice his own welfare for that of Kory during 
Kory's very early formative years. Travis was content to continue his military career with full 
knowledge that Kory was in the capable care of his maternal grandparents. He made littlejHuy) 
Qoncerted effort to contest the court decision to award legal custody of Kory to Mr _and Mrs. Thomock. 
Travis now has a stablelnairiage, family, aiiJhome which has increased his desire to regain legal 
custody of his son. There is no question that Travis loves Kory and wants him to be a part of his 
present family. From a social and psychological perspective it would be very disruptive to Kory to be 
uprooted from his "home." He has at least partially resolved the grief and pain associated with the loss 
of his birth parents^If he is subjected to another "loss^of'the only parents h* W PVPT really knowr^  it 
will cause potentially irreparable trauma to his fragile constitution— 
The willingness Travis is now demonstrating to sacrifice his own interest for that of Kory in 
noble_and admirablebut decidedly belated^d reflects his own needs rather than those of Kory. 
"The parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of 
parents in general" 
Travis has demonstrated sympathy and understanding of Kory's needs in the recent past. His 
understanding of Kory's needs are based on Travis's perception of what is in Kory's best interest. He 
stands firm in his belief that Kory should be with a biological parent and he, Travis, has done nothing to 
preclude him from assuming his role as Kory's father. He does have the "sympathy and understanding" 
for Kory that is usually characteristic of parents in general but this quality is of recent origin and there 
is no indication that he has consistently demonstrated this characteristic during Kory's childhood. He is 
a very good father to the children in his present family and has demonstrated the ability to be sensitive 
to their needs for age appropriate sympathy and understanding. 
In summary, Travis does not appear to have demonstrated the "Hutchinson factors" with 
regard to Kory over the duration of his son's childhood. There in no question that he loves his son and 
wants to resume his role as Kory's father. He has the capacity to meet Kory's needs in the future but 
the issue appears to be Kory's ability to tolerate another "loss" in his life and the fact that his early 
developmental needs could not be put on hold while Travis matured. Kory has established a 
parent/child bond with the Mr. and Mrs. Thomock and it would not be in his best interest to disrupt this 
bond at this time. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lynn M. Jacobson, MSW 
Certified Social Worker 
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h regard to the issue that's been raised, that is 
question of custody of Cory. 
In addressing that question, the law in this 
te seems to be very clear that in order to do so, 
h the fact situation as we have it in this case, I 
5t do certain things preparatory to discussing 
at's in the best interests and welfare of the child. 
Ms. Burr made the observation while Mr. 
vis was outside of the courtroom, that this is a 
y difficult time for her client, it's a very 
otional time. I understand that one hundred 
cent. It's a very emotional time for him, I'm sure 
a very emotional time for his family, it's an 
otional time for Mr. and Mrs. Thornock and I suspect 
an emotional time for the mother. 
And let me assure all of you folks, as we 
here today in this courtroom, it's an extremely 
otional time for Cory. He's only seven. And we are 
)t older. 
And ultimately, the bottom line should be 
t we all should be focused on the same question and 
t is, what's in his best interest. And that's the 
d thing in this case, because the father has 
crests, as the mother has interests, as the 
ndparents have interests. And all of those 
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rests are legitimate. 
Cory is a fortunate little boy in that he 
a lot of people to love him and unfortunately, we 
all too often examples on our own, without having 
x>me to the courthouse of little children who don't 
e parents that love them. And we see them in the 
rthouse as well. 
I have the responsibility as a trial judge 
nake a determination as to the issue of parental 
sumption. In this state, there is a parental 
sumption of a natural parent in favor of the 
iral parent over a non-parent. 
The Hutchinson court which rendered the 
ision in this case that has been referred to by Mr. 
Dbsen and counsel, is Hutchinson vs. Hutchinson 
ided in 1982, has been subsequently referred to in 
?r cases, particularly those that have dealt with 
issue of parent versus non-parent relationships. 
R.S. vs. State of Utah, the 1997 case and others. 
y have all made it very clear that in this State, 
parental presumption exists. 
The case law says, however, and I-and I 
c at-at Hutchinson for this guidance, indicates 
in a controversy over custody, the paramount 
Page 711 
1 where one party to the controversy is a non-parent, 
2 there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent. 
3 The natural-the parental presumption is not 
4 conclusive. That doesn't mean it stands regardless of 
5 what is demonstrated. The parental presumption can be 
6 rebutted, as has been indicated by the case law, by 
7 demonstrating, as Hutchinson says, by evidence 
8 establishes that a particular parent at a particular 
9 time~and I think that phrase is significant in this 
10 case-generally lacks all three of the characteristics 
11 that give rise to the presumption. And then those 
12 three characteristics are set forth in that case. 
13 The case law in Utah further goes on to say 
14 that if the presumption in favor of the natural parent 
15 is rebutted, the contestants for the custody of the 
16 child compete on equal footing and the custody award 
17 should then be determined based on the reference of 
18 what is in the best interests of the child. 
19 Now, with that background so that these 
20 folks who are not lawyers understand the parameters on 
21 which I have to deal with this case and I think it's 
22 important that you do understand that. All too often, 
23 I think we-litigants come to Court and lawyers 
24 understand what's happening, but when cases are 
25 finished and they walk outside, clients turn to J 
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1 lawyers and they say "What happened?" 
2 That has been a real concern to me and I 
3 hope it never happens in my courtroom, I suspect it 
4 will, but I certainly hope it doesn't happen here. 
5 That's why I gave you the background and referred the 
6 information historically as to the guidelines that I 
7 have to function under with respect to arriving at a 
8 decision of custody. 
9 Therefore, I found initially that 
10 significant change of circumstance has existed 
11 allowing consideration of the petition for 
12 modification. 
13 I have recognized and found that the 
14 parental presumption does occur and is in place in 
15 this State now. 
16 Considering all of the information which has 
17 been presented to this date, which consists of that 
18 which has been presented by way of written documents 
19 in the file, that which has been addressed on the 
20 record here today and discussed with the Court in 
21 chambers, the report of the evaluator which the 
22 parties agreed to and my discussion with Cory, I find 
23 that the presumption in favor of the natural father is 
24 rebutted. 1 
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1 says , the contestants for custody then compete on 
2 equal footing. A n d the decision must then rise or 
3 fall based upon what is in the best interests o f the 
4 child. 
5 A number of factors then must be considered 
6 b y m e in deciding what the best—best interests and 
7 welfare o f Cory is. Considering looking at all o f 
8 those factors as they have been enunciated in the 
9 Hutchinson case and reaffirmed by the R.S. v s . State 
10 case in 1 9 9 7 , 1 find that all o f the factors weigh in 
11 favor of the Thornocks for the custody of Cory. 
12 It is this Court's finding that the three 
13 considerations as referenced b y Mr. Jacobsen and as 
14 set forth by the case law in Utah have been met. At a 
15 particular time, this Court finds that the evidence 
16 weighs against Mr. Davis as to all three of those 
Il7 issues. 
18 When Mr. Davis raised a real good 
19 observation that was contained in Mr. Hutchinson's--or 
120 Mr. Jacobsen!s report and h i s - I ' m paraphrasing his 
21 words, and what let—his words just stood out and 
122 slapped m e when I first read it. A n d those words were 
23 to the effect that, "I'm not a bad dad, where did I 
124 lose m y rights as a father to this child?" That's 
25 pretty close to what the question was that w a s put to 
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1 the examiner. 
2 You're right, Mr. Davis, you are not a bad 
3 dad. But I need to assure you that you haven't lost 
4 your rights to your son. There is a significance 
5 difference between what we do in deciding custody 
6 questions as opposed to what we do when we make a 
7 determination as to rights of parents and children, 
8 whether they terminated or not. 
9 We are not determining parental unfitness 
10 issues. We are not looking at abandonment issues and 
11 substantial neglect issues in this case; we are 
12 looking at the factors to be considered in determining 
13 the best interests and welfare of Cory. 
14 As to those three factors, this Court finds 
15 that there is not a strong mutual bond that exists 
16 now, nor was there a strong mutual bond that existed 
17 in the last number of years, while Mr. Davis has been 
18 away and his son has been in the United States. 
19 Cory loves his father. Cory recognizes 
20 Travis as his father. Cory recognizes Elizabeth as 
21 his mother. And he sees Sandy and George as his 
22 grandpa and grandma, as Sandy and George and sometimes 
23 as mom and dad. He's only seven. But he has the 
24 ability and demonstrates that ability to - to perceive 
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1 people. 
2 He does not have that strong mutual bond 
3 that is neces sary -wi th his father that is necessary 
4 for m e to take h im out o f the situation where he is 
5 now. That doesn't mean, Mr. Davis , that he won't . 
6 But it does mean, historically, it has not existed and 
7 presently, it does not exist. 
8 Cory's feelings-this goes to the bond of 
9 relationship. Cory's feelings are extremely c lose to 
10 the surface when he is talked with about his 
11 relationships between all of these people and where 
12 he's l iving and where he calls home. They were so 
13 c lose to the surface that as he and I talked about 
14 them, his eyes swel led with tears, his chin quivered, 
15 he became uncomfortable in talking about i t~didn't 
16 say he didn't want to talk to me about it, but it w a s 
17 hard for him. 
18 T i m e - w e l l , the old expression of t ime seems 
19 to heal everything, somet imes time creates problems. 
20 In this instance, t ime has created a problem. T ime 
21 has not been on your side, but as I said, t ime m a y 
22 wel l be on your side to a l low that bond to exist . 
23 I remember many years ago that presenting, 
24 whi le I w a s practicing law, a man w h o has f ive s o n s -
25 s ix sons, excuse me , he has six sons and his wi fe had 
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1 custody o f all o f those children and she made it 
2 extremely difficult on h im to see those children, to 
3 see his boys . A n d as they were teenagers, his feeling 
4 and it was correct, was that the boys didn't like him. 
5 M y - - m y only observation, m y only advice that 
6 I could give to h im w a s , s imply keep being their 
7 father. A n d as they get older, they wi l l recognize 
! 8 the need for that relationship and I believe that 
9 eventually, this antagonism which is there, wi l l leave 
10 and they'll want to be with you. 
j 11 It happened. It happened one at a time, 
12 with all s ix, but it happened. And he has an 
113 absolutely wonderful relationship with those boys now; 
14 but time, sometimes has to work its own magic. 
115 A s to the second factor. The parent has not 
16 demonstrated a wil l ingness to sacrifice his or her o w n 
17 interest in the welfare for the children. From a 
18 trial judge perspective, a total consideration o f 
19 historical situation in the present situation has to 
20 be looked at to answer, or to address that factor. 
21 A n d when I take that factor and plug it back 
22 into the first part o f the phrase of the particular 
23 t ime in question, I find that the evidence indicates 
24 that Mr. Davis did not demonstrate a wil l ingness to 
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tiild. 
Now, things may be changing now with respect 
) Mr. Davis and where he sits in his own personal 
fe, which takes us to the third factor of the 
nderstanding of the--of the child's needs. Cory 
eeds to have a relationship with his father, he needs 
) have a relationship with his mother, he needs to 
ave a relationship with all of his grandparents; but 
lost of all, right now, Cory needs to know where he 
elongs. And right now, for this little boy's best 
iterests and welfare, for his health, not just 
hysically, but for his mental well being and his 
motional stability and well being, he needs to know 
lat he belongs in the home where he presently is. 
Now, that may-that statement may be 
xtremely rewarding, gratifying and very positive to 
Ir. and Mrs. Thornock, but they better understand and 
salize that that is-that that may well not always be 
le case. Because there may well come that time when, 
s my friend found in his life, Mr. Davis' son may 
rant to be with his father and no longer live with his 
randparents. 
Cory doesn't feel that he knows his father 
ery well. Cory understands that people tell him that 
is father loves him. He says his dad tells him that, 
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e says Sandy tells him that, that his dad loves him; 
ut right now, at seven, actions~as the saying-as 
le saying goes, have spoken louder than words and he 
eeds time to be able to absorb and see and to be 
onvinced that you love him. Saying and doing are two 
ifferent things. 
He wants to have an association with his 
ather but he does not want to live with his father, 
le and I even talked about the question in visitation. 
F he lived with his dad and visiting Sandy and 
reorge; if we lived with Sandy and George and visiting 
nth his dad. We-he and I talked about a lot of 
lings. Some things really didn't matter to what we 
ad to address here this afternoon, but you just can't 
imply dump on a seven-year-old the heavy questions 
lat we can address here as adults and expect them to 
andle them and deal with them. 
And so you've got to talk about Michael and 
le other people that are his friends and some of his 
ouse and the fact that Travis' little girl doesn't 
lways share like she should. And I told him, don't 
rorry about that, sometimes little boys don't always 
hare like they should, either. And then he finally 
aid, well, after we talked, maybe he could share 
Page 79 
He wants to visit with his father. He knows 
that if he continues to live where he is, with his 
grandparents, that visitation is in the making and he 
is not resistant to that at all. But he needs the 
assurance right now that when he's through visiting, 
he's coming back home. 
Now, I've said it three times and I'll say 
it four times and then I won't anymore. Home may be 
different in awhile, but right now, home is where he 
lives with his grandparents. He wants to remain where 
he is. It's important to him that he remain where he 
is. 
In considering all of the factors in this 
case as to what's in his best interests, all of those 
factors as enunciated by Hutchinson as well as the 
other cases that we've looked at, in considering in 
general, of what Cory needs and what his feelings are 
now, after talking with him, the custody will remain 
with the Thornocks, with visitation with the father. 
Now, as to the question of visitation with 
the father, that was addressed by Ms. Burr as she 
asked Mr. Jacobsen questions. For the time being, to 
be able to foster this relationship which you hope can 
exist, Mr. Davis, and to be able to make this-to be 
able to put to rest the apprehension that Cory has in 
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his life—and let me tell you something, he has 
apprehension. He would rather have been at school 
lunch today and I told him I would rather have been to 
school lunch today. 
I believe it is appropriate that the 
visitation take place under the statutory guidelines. 
Those guidelines, I do not believe, as I look at all 
of the factors in this case, I do not believe they are 
too restrictive nor do I believe they are too liberal. 
He is now in a posture to be able to function and go 
with his dad and have the visitation as allowed by the 
statutory guidelines. 
And I do not believe that we need to impose 
third persons into the situation, to monitor it, to 
facilitate it, to make sure everything's going to be 
okay. Let Cory make the adaption between his home now 
and the stability that's there and his father and that 
relationship which Mr. Davis wants to develop with his 
son. 
If the grandparents in this case choose to 
do anything to discourage Cory from having a 
relationship with his father, you are making a serious 
mistake in that boy's life. If you really love him as 
much as all of the information appears to suggest you 
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1 relationship, because he's--hefs a pretty healthy kid 
2 right now. And if he becomes torn between trying to 
3 please Sandy and George and trying to fulfill the need 
I 4 as a father and son, he is going to have major 
I 5 emotional and-and mental health problems. 
6 And I tell you, Mr. and Mrs. Thornock, if 
7 you interfere in the relationship between this boy and 
8 his father, you interfere in the well being of this 
j 9 little boy. 
10 He wants to live with you, he wants to stay 
II there, he wants the stability of the home, he likes 
112 where his toys are, he likes to be at your house, he 
113 can handle the sharing problems okay; but--but when 
14 the visitation's over, he wants to know that hefs 
15 coming back home. Right now, that is extremely 
16 significant for him. 
17 Those comments represent my evaluation of 
18 the case based upon the evidence as it has been 
19 received, based upon the reports that have been 
20 considered by me and read by counsel, based upon my 
21 consultation with counsel and most importantly, based 
22 upon my opportunity to talk with Cory. He's a 
23 delightful kid. I had a fun visit with him and when I 
24 told him I liked his boots and that I have a pair just 
25 like those except my leather at the top is tan and his 
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1 is dark brown, he said, You do? And I said, Yeah, I 
j 2 do. 
3 Told him that I have kids and now I have 
4 grandchildren and we had a nice visit. I don't want 
5 to do anything that would impair this little boy's 
6 growth and maturity; rather, I want to do everything 
7 that will encourage it in every aspect of his life. 
8 And I believe that if we all—if we all work 
9 toward the same purpose and the same goal, that can be 
10 done. 
11 My final observation to you, ladies and 
12 gentlemen, is this: As I've indicated, you people 
13 that sit here today look at each other, are looking at 
14 the people who are most important in this little boy's 
15 life. Some time, somehow, you have to find in your 
16 hearts, in your minds, the need to bury the hatchet 
17 and the bad feelings that have existed in the past and 
18 get on with the better things in life. And that-and-
19 -and the better thing in life in this case is the 
20 little boy that we're talking about. 
21 I know it's hard to let bygones be bygones, 
22 so to speak, but if you ever had to do it, you need to 
23 do it here. You really need to do it here. Now, I 
24 think there is no better way to do it than finally 
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1 work towards the same goal and that is to let Cory be 
2 happy and let him mature and develop as he will and 
3 everybody give him good, positive input. 
4 He likes school, he's got four teachers. I 
5 said, how can you have four? I thought you'd have two 
6 or three, how can you have four? He assured me he had 
7 four. 
8 Has he got four? 
9
 MRS. THORNOCK: He's got fOUT. 
10 THE COURT: And kindergarten is okay, but 
11 first grade's better. You just now have to get along. 
12 And you've got~you've got the ultimate reason in the 
13 world to get along. I don't know of any reason you 
14 can't or shouldn't. 
15 And that is where we are with respect to the 
16 issue of custody. 
17 That then brings us to the questions in the 
18 other matters that we need to address in this~in this 
19 case, whether you've arrived at them by way of 
20 stipulation or what you want to do with them. 
21 MS. BROWN: We have, your Honor. We had the 
22 issue of medical records. We have agreed that both 
23 parents can have a right to access to medical records, 
24 both parents will provide health insurance information 
25 to grandparents, health insurance that they have to 
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1 Cory. The grandparents will provide medical bills to 
2 both Travis and Lisa within 30 days for reimbursement 
3 of each of their one-half share. Both parents have 
4 the ability to contact any care providers to obtain 
5 information. 
j 6 In regard to school, both parents will 
j 7 receive information regarding the child's school 
8 events, by providing envelopes to the school to 
I 9 receive the information. Both parents can participate 
10 in parent-teacher conferences. Both parents can have 
II full access to school records. Both parents can 
12 participate in special school activities and there 
13 will be no disruption at school will be caused by the 
14 visiting parent. 
15 The parties will abide-oh, that's—I—I 
16 guess abide by the orders of the Court. We-we've had 
17 a little problem in changes, visitation and let me 
18 just say that anything-any changes and this is 
19 something we haven't talked about, but any to 
20 visitation must be approved in writing by both parents 
21 or by both parties, or they just go with the court-
22 ordered visitation. 
23
 THE COURT: Let me just make an observation 
24 on that. I referred to guidelines for visitation. 
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TRAVIS DAVIS, * FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* (Trial September 29, 1999) 
VS. 
ELIZABETH ANN DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
SANDY THORNOCK AND GEORGE T. 
THORNOCK, 
Interveners. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Civil No: 
Judge: 
964401886 
Gary D. Stott 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for trial on September 29, 1999. The Petitioner 
appeared and was represented by Linda Quinton-Burr. The Respondent appeared Pro Se. The 
Intervenors appeared and were represented by Marilyn Moody Brown. Based on the evidence 
presented and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows: 
1. The parties stipulated that the Court would meet with the minor child, Kory, in chambers, 
without either attorney present. The testimony of the child was utilized by the Court to 
make a determination of the facts of this case. 
2. The Court finds that, as demonstrated in the record and pleadings, a change of 
circumstances has been presented to allow modification of the prior order. 
An evaluation of custody was performed by Lyn Jacobson, Certified Social Worker. It 
was stipulated that the two reports of the evaluator would be made a part of the court 
record. 
There is a parental presumption in favor of a natural parent over a non-parent. The Court 
relies on Hutchison vs. Hutchison, 649 P 2d. 38 (1982) in reaching its determination. 
Utah Law indicates that it is clear that a parental presumption exists. The case law in 
Hutchinson indicates that in a controversy over custody, the paramount consideration is 
the best interest of the child. The Parental presumption is not conclusive and can be 
rebutted by demonstrating evidence showing that a particular parent at a particular time 
generally lacks all three characteristics that give rise to the presumption: 1) strong bonding 
with the child; 2) a tendency to sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's 
benefit; and 3) a tendency to be more sympathetic and understanding of the child than 
anyone else. (See Hutchison, @ 41). If the presumption is rebutted, the contestants 
compete on equal footing and the award should be determined on the best interest of the 
child. The Court recognizes that parental presumption does occur and is in place in this 
instance. 
Considering all of the information presented in pleadings, testimony, the reports of the 
evaluator, and the judge's discussion with Kory, the Court finds that the presumption in 
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favor of the father is rebutted. 
6. It is this Court's findings that the three considerations, as referenced by Mr. Jacobson, 
have been met "at a particular time". This Court finds that the evidence weighs against 
Mr. Davis on all three issues. There is a significant difference in deciding custody 
questions and termination of rights to children. The Court is not looking at abandonment 
or substantial neglect. 
7. As to the three Hutchison factors, the Court finds that there is not a strong mutual bond 
existing now or in the past between the Petitioner and the child. This has been true for a 
number of years while Mr. Davis was away and his son has been in the United States. 
Kory loves his father and recognizes Travis as his father and Elizabeth as his mother. He 
sees Sandy and George Thornock as Grandpa and Grandma, and sometimes as Mom and 
Dad. He is only 7 but he has demonstrated the ability to perceive differences in 
relationships between all four people. He does not have a strong mutual bond with his 
father. A strong mutual bond would be necessary to take him out of the situation he is in 
now. Historically, and presently, it does not exist. 
8. The Court finds that the Father has not demonstrated that he has a tendency to sacrifice 
his personal interest and welfare for the child's benefit. A total consideration of the 
historical information, as indicated in the child custody evaluation, and in consultation with 
the child has to be looked at to address this. The Court indicates that Mr. Davis did not 
3 
demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice his own interest for the needs of the child. Travis 
made little or no concerted effort to contest the Court's initial decision to award custody 
of Kory to Mr. and Mrs. Thornock. Travis then voluntarily gave custody to the 
grandparents. 
Thirdly, the Court finds that the father lacks a tendency to be more sympathetic and 
understanding of the child than anyone else. Kory needs a relationship with his father, 
mother, and grandparents, but most of all, Kory needs to know where he belongs. His 
mental and emotional well-being depend on that. The father's actions have spoken louder 
than words to the child, and the child does not feel the father is understanding of his 
needs. The child needs time to be convinced that his father loves him. The child wants 
association with the father but does not want to live with his father. The child needs 
assurance that when he is through visiting, he will be coming back home. The child does 
not receive that assurance. 
After rebutting the parental presumption, the court finds that all of the Rule 4-903 factors 
have been considered: 
a. The court finds that the child's bond with the Thornocks is greater than the bond 
that he has with his father. The court finds that there is no strong mutual bond 
between the father and the child. 
b. Kory is very close to Bob, the Thornock's son, who lives in the Thornock home. 
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There is no benefit in keeping step siblings together. 
c. The court finds that Kory is happy, well adjusted and well taken care of and does 
not exhibit any distress or maladjustment in his present custodial home. The court 
finds it is in Kory's best interest to continue the custodial arrangement. 
d. The court finds that Travis made poor judgments in the past but now his life is 
stabilized. The Thornocks are both mature and the court finds that the Thornocks 
are favored in the area of moral character and emotional stability. 
e. The court finds that the Thornocks have a greater depth of desire for custody and 
this has been consistent since Kory was born. The father voluntarily gave custody 
to the Thornocks several years ago. 
f. The court finds that the area of religious compatibility and reason for having 
relinquished custody in the past are insignificant in the ultimate decision. 
g. All other factors weigh in favor of Thornocks including financial condition of the 
parties. 
11. The Court finds that the presumption in favor of father is rebutted. The contestants 
compete on equal footing in regard to the best interest of the child. A number of factors 
must be considered in determining the best interest of the child. In looking at the 4-903 
factors, they are weighed heavily in favor of the grandparents, therefore custody of Kory 
will remain with the grandparents, with visitation by the father. Visitation will continue to 
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take place under the statutory guidelines, which the Court finds are not too restrictive, nor 
too liberal. 
12. The court finds that there is no need to impose third parties to monitor, facilitate, or make 
certain visitation occurs. The child should be allowed to adapt and develop a relationship 
with his Father. 
13. Both parties will have the right of access to medical records. Both parents will provide 
health insurance information to the grandparents for the minor child. The grandparents 
will provide medical bills to Travis and Lisa within 30 days after payment for 
reimbursement of the parent's one-half share. Both parents have the ability to contact any 
care providers to obtain information. 
14. Both parents will receive information regarding the child's school events by providing 
envelopes to the school to receive the information. Both parents can participate in Parent-
Teacher conferences. Both parents can have full access to school records and school 
activities. Both parents can participate in special school activities. None of the parties 
will cause any disruption of the child's schooling. 
15. The parties are encouraged to accommodate each other's schedules with respect to 
visitation. There shall be no unilateral changes. 
16. The parties will allow the child to participate in Sunday religious services with the party 
that he may be with on that particular Sunday 
17. Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter. 
2. The Intervenors should be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child of the 
parties, subject to the Petitioner's reasonable rights of visitation as the non-custodial 
parent under the statutory guidelines 
NOTICE TO INTERVENOR'S ATTORNEY 
TO: MARILYN MOODY BROWN 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Petitioner, will submit the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Fourth District Court for 
signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for 
Linda Quinton-Burr (5732) 
JONES, GILLIAM & BURR 
Attorney for Petitioner -
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 224-2119 (Fax) 224-6345 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West Provo, Utah 84601 
TRAVIS DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH ANN DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
SANDY THORNOCK AND GEORGE T 
THORNOCK, 
Interveners. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for trial on September 29, 1999. The Petitioner 
appeared and was represented by Linda Quinton-Burr. The Respondent appeared Pro Se. The 
Intervenors appeared and were represented by Marilyn Moody Brown. Based on the evidence 
presented and good cause appearing, and having heretofore entered its FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows: 
1. Custody of Kory will remain with the grandparents, with visitation by the father. 
Visitation will continue to take place under the statutory guidelines. The parties are 
encouraged to accommodate each other's schedules with respect to visitation. There shall 
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be no unilateral changes. Visitation shall continue to take place under the statutory 
guidelines which the court finds are not too restrictive nor too liberal. 
2. The child should be allowed to adapt and develop a relationship with his father. 
3. Both parties have the right of access to medical records. Both parents are to provide 
health insurance information to the grandparents for the minor child. The grandparents 
will provide medical bills to the parents within 30 days after payment for reimbursement of 
each parent's one-half share. Both parents have the ability to contact any care providers 
to obtain information. 
4. Both parents are entitled to receive information regarding the child's school events by 
providing envelopes to the school to receive the information. Both parents can participate 
in Parent-Teacher conferences. Both parents can have full access to school records and 
school activities. Both parents can participate in special school activities. None of the 
parties will cause any disruption in the child's schooling. 
5. The parties are to allow the child to participate in Sunday religious services with the party 
that he may be with on that particular Sunday. 
6. Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees. 
DATED this ^L<^day of 60WUX , 2000. 
BY THE 
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Attorney for Intefvenors 
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Linda Quinton-Burr (5732) 
ASCIONE, JONER & BURR 
Attorney for Petitioner 
42 North University Avenue, #205 
P. O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 801-812-1000 
Fax: 801-374-1724 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West Provo, Utah 84601 
TRAVIS DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
* MOTION TO RELEASE 
* SEALED RECORD 
ELIZABETH ANN DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
SANDY THORNOCK AND GEORGE T. 
THORNOCK, 
Interveners. 
* 
* 
* Civil No: 
* Judge: 
* 
• 
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964401886 
Gary D. Stott 
By and through his attorney of record, Linda Quinton-Burr, and pursuant to Stipulation of 
the parties to the appeal of this matter, Petitioner moves the court for an Order releasing the 
sealed portion of the record which contains the Custody Evaluation of December 28, 1998 for 
inclusion in the Record on Appeal. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2001. 
ASCI9KE, JONER & 
QUINT 
"Attorney for Petitioher 
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Linda Quinton-Burr (5732) 
ASCIONE, JONER & BURR 
Attorney for Petitioner 
42 North University Avenue, #205 
P. O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 801-812-1000 
Fax: 801-374-1724 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West Provo, Utah 84601 
TRAVIS DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
* STIPULATION TO RELEASE 
* SEALED RECORD 
ELIZABETH ANN DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
SANDY THORNOCK AND GEORGE T. 
THORNOCK, 
Interveners. 
* Civil No: 
* Judge: 
* 
• 
* 
964401886 
Gary D. Stott 
Comes now the Petitioner by and through his attorney of record, Linda Quinton Burr, and 
Interveners, by and through their attorney of record, Leslie W. Slaugh, and stipulate that the 
custody evaluation dated December 28, 1998 which is a sealed record on file with this court be 
released to Linda Quinton Burr for review in preparation for the Appeal brief. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2001 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
Attorney for Intervenors 
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Attorney for Petitioner 
Linda Quinton-Burr (5732) 
ASCIONE, JONER & BURR 
Attorney for Petitioner 
42 North University Avenue, #205 
P. O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 801-812-1000 
Fax: 801-374-1724 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West Provo, Utah 84601 
TRAVIS DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
ELIZABETH ANN DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
SANDY THORNOCK AND GEORGE T. 
THORNOCK, 
Interveners. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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ORDER TO RELEASE 
SEALED RECORD 
Civil No: 964401886 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
Upon Motion by Petitioner and Stipulation by the parties, it is hereby: 
ORDERED that the Custody Evaluation dated December 28, 1988 which is a sealed 
record in this matter be released to Linda Quinton-Burr. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2001. 
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TEXT OF STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
U.S. Constitution: 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives - Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned - Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
Statute text 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution art. I 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
Statute text 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
Statute text 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people. 
History 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
Statute text 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over 
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
Rules Text 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made 
either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Utah Code of Appellate Procedure 
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
Rules Text 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or 
juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than 
the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only 
for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or 
order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of 
appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by 
stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the 
adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in 
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original 
proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the 
appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the 
court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a 
notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party 
to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the 
party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of 
appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the 
party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in 
a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee 
established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fee, 
the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, 
showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of 
the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An 
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant 
identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be 
added to the title. 
Rules History 
History: Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
Rules Text 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry 
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of 
the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under 
Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion 
under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A 
new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the 
order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before the 
entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the 
day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may 
file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or 
within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days 
after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice 
of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in 
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the 
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in an institution files a 
notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is 
deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing 
may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner 
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date 
when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
Rules History 
History: Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
Rules Text 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were 
asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which shows 
the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as 
to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making 
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 3-103. Administrative role of judges. 
Rules Text 
Intent: 
To establish the administrative duties and responsibilities of individual judges. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all judges of courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) It is the duty and responsibility of individual judges to cooperate with judges from all levels of 
courts, their presiding judges, their respective Boards and the Council in the development and 
implementation of court policy, goals and rules of administration. 
(2) In courts of record, it is the duty and responsibility of individual judges to consult with the 
presiding judge and to encourage court employees to consult with court executives on matters of 
judicial administration. In courts not of record, it is the responsibility of individual judges to 
consult with and encourage court employees to consult with the justice court administrator on 
matters of judicial administration. 
(3) It is the duty and responsibility of individual judges to manage their court responsibilities 
consistently with the administrative goals of the Council and the fair and efficient administration 
ofjustice. 
(4) It is the duty and responsibility of individual judges to give prior notice of their absence from 
the court for vacation or education purposes to the presiding judge, to determine when additional 
administrative or judicial assistance is necessary and to convey that need in a timely manner to the 
presiding judge. 
(5) In multi-judge jurisdictions, individual judges shall provide recommendations and directives to 
the court executive and the Administrative Office through the presiding judge. 
Rules History 
History: Amended effective November 15, 1995. 
